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Since its passage in 1977, the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) has re-
quired banks to help meet the credit needs of low- and moderate-income (LMI) 
residents and neighborhoods in a safe and sound manner.1 Spurred by the CRA, 
banks have played a critical role in helping build wealth for households and 
revitalizing many neighborhoods across New York City through their support of 
community development efforts and providing access to capital. For example, 
over 294,000 units of low- and moderate-income housing have been de-
veloped and renovated in New York City with a mix of public subsidy 
and private financing over the past twenty years. Additionally, billions 
of dollars in CRA-motivated loans, investment, and grants have been 
central to transforming entire blocks and neighborhoods across the five 
boroughs, catalyzing the growth of small businesses, and assisting resi-
dents build assets.
However, as detailed in ANHD’s July 2009 white paper, Community 
Development At-Risk: The Troubled Future of Bank Reinvestment in 
New York the changing nature of the banking industry has led to re-
trenchment in both the quantity and quality of community development 
support, placing these vital resources at risk and leading to a situation 
where banks are less focused on helping to meet the credit needs of 
underserved populations and areas. 
This report, The State of Bank Reinvestment in New York City: 2009 is based on 
data ANHD received from 17 of New York City’s largest commercial, savings, and 
wholesale banks and presents empirical evidence of this retrenchment between 
2007 and 2008. These reductions are denoted by red arrows in Appendix A. This re-
duced commitment is especially alarming to ANHD because it took place prior to 
the current recession and because one of the key markers ANHD looks for in deter-
   The changing  
nature of the banking 
industry has led to a  
situation where banks 
are less focused on 
helping to meet the 
credit needs of under-
served populations 
and areas. 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1 For the purpose of CRA, “Low” income is defined 
as a household earning 50% of the Area Median 
Income (AMI) and “Moderate” income represents 
households earning up to 80% AMI. See joint rule 
promulgated by the Comptroller of the Currency:  
12 C.F.R. §§  25.12(h)(2) 
Available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/fr/
cfrparts/12cfr25.htm. 
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mining which institutions are being responsive to the city’s credit needs is consistent 
improvement year-over-year across a bank’s reinvestment activities. 
The experience of Cypress Hills LDC, a Community Development Corporation 
(CDC) and active member of ANHD, illustrates how this retrenchment is severe-
ly impacting the ability of CDCs to respond to the community development and 
credit needs of New York City’s low- and moderate-income neighborhoods. Cy-
press Hills has a 26 year track record of building and preserving afford-
able housing for low- and moderate-income families in East New York, 
Brooklyn. In summer 2008, Cypress Hills was preparing to develop its 
newest project, Cypress Village, which was to be built on 12 vacant lots 
awarded to the organization through the city’s New Foundations pro-
gram. Looking to meet the huge demand for affordable homeownership 
opportunities that residents articulated, Cypress Hills proposed to in-
clude 29 condos and 9 two- and three-family homes in the project. Addi-
tionally, the homes were designed to have numerous green components 
and be deeply affordable, serving households earning less than 80% of 
Area Median Income (AMI), which would allow the mission-driven de-
veloper to help working class families become first-time homeowners.
The project received a tremendous amount of public and private investment in-
cluding various subsidies and grants.2  This level and range of investment typi-
cally makes it easier to attract private financing since the bank recognizes the 
lower-risk associated with a deeply subsidized project. On the private side, 
Cypress Hills was looking for a $5 million loan, which would be taken out by 
the condo sales. Despite the strong public and private commitment and signifi-
cant market demand for affordable condos, numerous banks including Bank of 
America, Banco Popular, BPD, JPMorgan Chase, and Wells Fargo were not in-
terested in financing this project. M&T Bank and Amalgamated have demon-
strated a good faith effort to support the project and Cypress Hills is optimis-
tic that the remaining financing will be secured, especially if it is converted to 
 a rental project.3 
Unfortunately, the experience of Cypress Hills was not unique. Indeed, as the find-
ings of this report demonstrate, there was a substantial decrease in the amount 
of CRA-related lending in neighborhoods across the city between 2007 and 2008. 
ANHD is troubled by this retrenchment and the lack of responsiveness by the 
city’s financial institutions to support many of those activities that truly make a 
difference in helping working class residents and communities flourish.
FINDINGS
ANHD undertook this research with the hope of gaining a better understanding 
of where banks have fulfilled their CRA obligations and where they are falling 
short. By analyzing this data and conducting dozens of conversations with lend-
     It is imperative to 
remember that every 
dollar lost means an-
other family may not 
have access to safe, 
affordable housing.
2 The Cypress Village project received support 
from the federal Neighborhood Stabilization 
Program, the New York State Affordable Hous-
ing Corporation, Brooklyn Borough President 
Marty Markowitz, Senator Martin Malavé 
Dilan, The Home Depot Foundation, TD Bank, 
Raza Development Fund, LISC, and Enterprise 
Green Communities..htm. 
 
3 Cypress Hills is considering converting this 
project from homeownership to rental-to-ho-
meownership or strictly rental due to difficulty 
obtaining construction financing and HPD’s 
decision to shift resources from homeowner-
ship to preservation deals. In terms of timing, 
it should be acknowledged that HPD did not 
announce this shift until February 2010 so the 
banks’ decision to not provide financing was 
made independent of this change in city policy.
4 Assessment Areas must consist only of 
whole geographies; may not reflect illegal 
discrimination; may not arbitrarily exclude 
low- or moderate-income geographies, taking 
into account the bank’s size and financial 
condition; and may not extend substantially 
beyond an MSA boundary or beyond a state 
boundary unless the assessment area is 
located in a multistate MSA. If a bank serves 
a geographic area that extends substantially 
beyond a state boundary, the bank shall delin-
eate separate assessment areas for the areas 
in each state. If a bank serves a geographic 
area that extends substantially beyond an MSA 
boundary, the bank shall delineate separate 
assessment areas for the areas inside and 
outside the MSA. See: http://law.justia.com/
us/cfr/title12/12-3.0.1.1.9.3.8.1.html
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ers, regulators, policy experts and community members, it became clear that the 
majority of banks, despite their growth, are struggling to prioritize the commit-
ment of the necessary resources to do their part in helping to meet the tremendous 
credit needs of low- and moderate-income communities. It should be noted that 
ANHD believes a bank’s CRA obligations for a given assessment area4 should re-
flect its size. To the right is a summary of the report’s five key findings, which will 
be explained in much greater detail in Part I.
While the quantifiable reductions in lending and services are stunning, it is im-
perative to remember that every dollar lost means another family may not have 
access to safe, affordable housing, or that a small business owner may not be able 
to obtain the capital to stay competitive, or the community-revitalization efforts 
that have begun to transform a neighborhood may be reversed. Certainly, the im-
pact has been particularly devastating on activities that focused on community 
development and the renewal of physical space.
The banks’ lack of response to the foreclosure crisis has been particularly disap-
pointing. Since ANHD did not request this information, we relied on data available 
for the federal Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP). As of March 2010, 
the city’s largest banks have served only a fraction of the homeowners facing fore-
closure. Indeed, only 26% of the mortgages being serviced by Bank of America, the 
city’s largest servicer, that were eligible for modification were either in a trial or 
permanent modification.  
BANK RANKINGS FOR 2007 AND 2008
The rankings presented in the State of Bank Reinvestment in New York City: 2009 
report are not intended to characterize banks as either “good” or “bad.” Rather, they 
are meant to provide a snapshot of how well banks doing business in the city 
served the credit needs of LMI households and neighborhoods compared to their 
peers in 2007 and 2008. Complete rankings for commercial, savings, and wholesale 
banks are listed in the Centerfold pullout of this publication. 
As the Methodology section below explains, ANHD compiled data on 37 differ-
ent reinvestment activities including branching, staffing, community development 
lending, multi-family lending, home purchase lending, CRA-qualified investment, 
and philanthropy. To determine the rankings, ANHD selected nine indicators that 
represent core reinvestment activities and those areas where the most data was 
provided by the banks. To further simplify the rankings, ANHD chose not to weight 
the indicators. In other words, it is the relative ranking that matters in this meth-
odology, not the magnitude of the differential between one bank’s level of lending, 
investment, or services and another’s. 
The rankings do not account for several qualitative indicators, such as the de-
velopment of a local CRA plan, which ANHD has identified as being cen-
THE FIVE KEY FINDINGS:
1)  17 of New York City’s largest 
banks, as measured by deposits, 
grew by over 10% between 2007  
and 2008. 
2)  Despite this growth, the 17 
banks reduced substantially the 
amount of loans and  services 
targeted to low- and moderate-
income communities between 2007 
and   2008. A few key statistics 
that capture the magnitude of this 
reduction include:
• A decrease of $560 million in 
community development lending, 
or  a 20.2% reduction;
• A decrease of $1.3 billion in 
multi-family lending, which  
represents a 24.2% cut;
• A decrease in the share of 
branches located in low-income 
tracts from 9.3% to 8.8%
3)   An expanding appetite for CRA-
eligible investment, including Low 
Income Housing Tax Credits. The 
amount of investment grew by over 
$170 million, a 27.2% increase.
4)   Discouraging trends in how 
the banks carry out their CRA-
related activities that have  had a 
negative effect on what was once 
a much more robust, responsive 
system. For example, many banks 
have dismantled their specialized 
community development lending 
groups, which has had harmful 
consequences for the availability of 
both innovative products and staff 
that is knowledgeable about com-
munity development programs in 
the New York City market. 
5) Regulators seem to lack rec-
ognition of or interest in revers-
ing these trends by requiring that 
banks maintain a robust, respon-
sive strategy and develop a local 
CRA plan. 
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tral to determining a bank’s responsiveness. Although it is our intention to incorpo-
rate these factors in the next year’s State of Bank Reinvestment report, we made 
every attempt to note in the narrative those institutions that were excelling or falling short 
in these areas. 
There are numerous banks that continue to be responsive partners; as a whole, however, 
ANHD is disappointed with the direction the banking industry has taken related to serv-
ing low- and moderate-income populations in New York City. Given the recent experiences 
of our 99 community based members, we are not optimistic that the banks’ 2009 numbers 
will be more encouraging. 
RECOMMENDATIONS
ANHD believes there are several key steps than can be taken in both the immediate and 
intermediate terms to reverse the trends affecting how well low- and moderate-income 
communities are served by the city banks as well as modernize the regulatory system to 
ensure financial institutions are responsive to the credit needs of all New Yorkers. As Part 
III notes, these include strengthening the enforcement underpinnings of CRA by creating 
more leverage for community engagement and incentivizing banks to seek the highest 
CRA rating. 
Additionally, banks, regulators, and community advocates must consider the outcomes 
and impact of a financial institution’s reinvestment activities and not just the number and 
dollar amount. Indeed, ANHD believes the stability and profitability of these activities 
and the long-term financial and economic health of the community should be inherently 
linked. In order to better balance the profit-oriented motivation of banks with the credit 
needs of working class communities, we propose the following immediate and intermedi-
ate actions: 
 IMMEDIATE TERM
Encourage regulators to tailor assessment criteria to the local performance context 
and place more emphasis on community development such as the creation and pres-
ervation of multi-family rental housing and activities that promote economic develop-
ment and neighborhood revitalization and stabilization. 
Strengthen the regulatory system by developing regulations that value both the quan-
tity and quality of lending, investment, and services in performance exams.
Incentivize development of local plans and reporting.
Enhance meaning of “Outstanding” rating and increase incentives to achieve it.
Establish a clear CRA commitment for Bank Holding Companies and all 
non-bank affiliates.
•
•
•
•
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Maximize consistency and transparency across the four federal  
regulatory agencies. 
INTERMEDIATE TERM
Pass a local “Responsible Banking” Ordinance that requires banks doing business with 
the City of New York to submit a report that documents their investment in local com-
munities and that informs what institutions the city decides to do business with.
Pass federal CRA Modernization legislation that would expand the type of institutions 
covered by CRA, create a community development test for commercial banks, require 
federal regulatory agencies to hold more public hearings and meetings when banks 
merge, and enhance accountability through data disclosure.
Create a fully empowered, independent Consumer Financial Protection Agency.
Given their role in exacerbating the housing bubble and de-stabilizing the economy and 
our communities, New York City’s financial institutions should play a leadership role in the 
city’s recovery. Regrettably, the majority of banks have not been creative or proactive in 
the development of strategies for stabilizing working class households and neighborhoods 
during this period of economic turmoil. 
The ongoing ability of working class residents to build wealth and the continued vitality of 
our city’s neighborhoods are dependent on banks affirming their commitment to providing 
a meaningful amount of CRA-motivated loans, investment, and services that are respon-
sive to local needs.
•
•
•
•
THE STATE OF BANK REINVESTMENT IN NEW YORK CITY: 2009  |  ANHD 
1 SUMMARY
ANHD  |  INTRODUCTION
 INTRODUCTION 7 
Passed in 1977 in response to the devastating impact that redlining and disinvest-
ment had on urban areas, the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) states that 
banks have an affirmative obligation to help meet the credit needs of low- and 
moderate-income residents and neighborhoods in a safe and sound manner. This 
obligation stems from the banks being publicly chartered, receiving low-cost de-
posit insurance and having access to inexpensive credit from the Federal 
Reserve Bank’s discount window. Spurred by the CRA, banks have played 
a critical role in helping build wealth for households and revitalizing 
many neighborhoods across the city through their support of community 
development efforts and providing access to capital.  
Since 1987, over 294,000 units of low- and moderate-income housing have 
been developed and renovated in New York City with a mix of public sub-
sidy and private financing. The vast majority of these affordable housing 
deals were made possible by bank support in the form of construction and 
permanent financing, letters of credit, investment in government credit 
facilities and tax credit programs, and philanthropy. CRA-motivated lend-
ing and investment has also ensured first-time home buyers can get an afford-
able mortgage, small businesses have access to capital, and institutions serving 
the community have the resources they need. Across the country, CRA has been 
responsible for over $6 trillion in lending and investment in low- and moderate-
income communities.5
In New York, this reinvestment has been central to revitalizing dozens of neigh-
borhoods across the five boroughs, transforming entire blocks, catalyzing the 
growth of small businesses, and assisting residents build assets. For example, 
Brooklyn’s Bedford Stuyvesant neighborhood has long suffered from a lack of 
investment and run-down housing and commercial properties made the problem 
INTRODUCTION
   In New York,  
this reinvestment 
has been central to 
revitalizing dozens 
of neighborhoods 
across the five  
boroughs.
5  National Community Reinvestment Coalition 
(NCRC). CRA Toolkit. 
Available at: http://www.ncrc.org/images/
stories/era/cra%20toolkit_v8_remarks_joint_
statement.pdf  
THE STATE OF BANK REINVESTMENT IN NEW YORK CITY: 2009  |  ANHD 
INTRODUCTION8
worse. In 2002, a local not-for-profit, the Pratt Area Community Council (PACC), 
began a block-by-block project on Fulton Street to turn the vacant lots into af-
fordable housing and spruce up dilapidated storefronts. PACC used every public 
subsidy program at their disposal, but many of the projects could not have hap-
pened without the investment of local banks through their community 
development programs. For example, Capital One’s efforts to have this 
area designated a Banking Development District, meaning that it is 
under-banked, allowed it to open a much needed branch and receive 
city money to shore up its deposit base. A larger source of deployable 
capital allowed the bank to make home purchase and small business 
loans to local residents as well as provide PACC a construction loan 
for a new 16 unit mixed-income property where half of the units serve 
low-income households.   
The changing nature of the banking industry, fueled by banks grow-
ing through consolidation, has led to retrenchment in both the quan-
tity and quality of community development support available to 
working class communities in New York City. According to the FDIC, 
there was a 17% decrease in the number of FDIC-insured deposi-
tory institutions (both commercial banks and savings institutions) be-
tween 1998 and 2008.6 Over this same period of time, eleven of New York City’s 
25 largest banks were acquired by and merged with other large institutions to 
create a sector dominated by mega-banks.7 JPMorgan Chase’s shotgun acqui-
sition of Washington Mutual—facilitated by the FDIC’s quick approval in Sep-
tember 2008 8—represents how these mergers often result in a net loss in lend-
ing, investment and services as the combined bank does less than the separate 
institutions. Evidence of this reduction will be presented throughout the report 
and is summarized in Appendix D. Furthermore, the evolution of a banking in-
dustry dominated by community-based banks to one controlled by national 
institutions has resulted in the banks growing increasingly distant from the 
local community.
Indeed, as banks have grown, many have altered how they approach reinvestment, 
shifting from making local commitments with key community stakeholders that are 
rooted in actual credit needs and opportunities to large national programs that have 
big, broad goals but very few specifics and little accountability. These trends have 
been intensifying for years and led ANHD to undertake this empirical research which 
confirms that both outputs and outcomes of banks’ CRA-related activities have suf-
fered. In light of the fact that billions of dollars in taxpayer investment was made in 
these institutions, this reduction and unresponsiveness to community credit needs 
are inexcusable.
    As banks have grown, 
many have shifted from  
making local commitments 
with key community stake-
holders to large national  
programs that have very  
few specifics and little  
accountability. 
6  FDIC Statistics on Banking: Changes in 
Number and Classification of FDIC-Insured 
Depository Institutions. Available at: www2.
fdic.gov/SDI/SOB9812/all101.asp
7 for Wachovia, Wells Fargo is now the 
relevant institution. Going forward, ANHD 
will submit information requests to Wells 
Fargo. A press release detailing the merger 
is available at: https://www.wellsfargo.com/
press/2009/20090101
8  Palmeri, Christopher. “JPMorgan Chase 
to Buy Washington Mutual,” Business Week. 
Available at: http://www.businessweek.
com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/sep2008/
db20080925_760466.htm?campaign_ 
id=rss_daily
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Historically, ANHD requested information from banks regarding their branch-
ing and staffing, lending, investment, and philanthropy in conjunction with a 
CRA performance exam or in response to a proposed merger or acquisition. Al-
though this strategy was effective in allowing us to weigh in on individual ac-
tions, we recognized that a more proactive approach was necessary to more 
comprehensively analyze the CRA-related activities of our key bank partners. 
Additionally, anecdotal evidence suggested that banks across the industry 
were changing their approach to CRA, which was leading to both reductions in 
the amount of lending and investment, and the development of programs and 
products that were less responsive to local credit needs and community devel-
opment opportunities. However, other than branching and home mortgage 
data, the vast majority of information related to a bank’s CRA activities is not 
publicly available. 
Therefore, beginning in the spring 2008, ANHD began submitting detailed infor-
mation requests to 20 of New York City’s largest banks.9 ANHD has been encour-
aged by the willingness of most of the city’s banks to provide us with the requested 
data. Indeed, of the 20 banks we have submitted information requests to, 90 percent 
(18 banks) have returned at least partial responses. ANHD believes this strong re-
sponse rate reflects the spirit of the CRA and banks’ recognition that public input 
is a vital component of their ability to identify credit needs and opportunities. 
For the two non-responsive banks,10 ANHD made every attempt to acquire infor-
mation by searching the bank’s annual reports and their most recent federal and 
state performance evaluations. However, the information found through these 
methods is imprecise for our purposes because data is either presented for differ-
ent time periods and geographic areas or not disclosed at all.11  The data that was 
METHODOLOGY
9  Size was determined based on total New 
York City deposits. A sample request letter is 
enclosed as Appendix C.
10 The following banks have been unrespon-
sive to our requests: New York Community 
Bancorp and Signature Bank. Additionally, 
American Express, Goldman Sachs, and 
Morgan Stanley, which became Bank Hold-
ing Companies in 2008, will begin to receive 
requests this summer related to their 2009 
activities. 
11  For example, data included in this analysis 
for New York Community Bank was compiled 
from their most recent state performance 
exam, which covered the period of 2005 and 
2006, and some data for Signature Bank cov-
ers geographic areas outside of New York City.
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obtained for these two institutions show that they are among the city’s lowest performers, 
which may explain why they were reluctant to respond.  
Overall, the amount of data we received enabled us to conduct this analysis, but it is admit-
tedly imperfect given the fact that many banks did not report across all data points. As will 
be discussed in Part III, one of ANHD’s key priorities for CRA modernization is to require 
banks to report this important information on an annual basis. The banks’ responses are 
summarized in Appendix A. 
While individual indicators are useful in ascertaining a bank’s year-over-year record in a 
certain area over time, ANHD also wanted to compare and rank banks against their peers 
to examine which institutions were leaders within the industry. In an attempt to control 
for the wide variance in size and the various charters of the institutions, which are central 
to informing their respective business plans, ANHD—for comparison purposes—grouped 
these 20 institutions into the following three categories: 
Commercial Banks
A commercial or retail bank’s primary focus is providing financial services to corporations. 
Commercial banks also accept deposits and offer retail products to individuals including 
checking and savings accounts, money market accounts, credit cards, and an array of se-
cured and unsecured loans.  While commercial banks are not required to have a national 
service area, the footprint of the majority of New York City’s commercial banks covers 
numerous markets.  
Savings Banks
A savings bank’s primary purpose is personal banking through the provision of checking 
and savings accounts, credit cards, home purchase and equity loans, and financial services 
to both individuals and small- or medium-sized businesses. Savings banks tend to have a 
much more narrow service area although some of the savings banks included in our analy-
sis have a multi-state presence. 
Wholesale Banks
A wholesale bank provides financial services to large corporate clients, mid-sized compa-
nies, real estate developers and investors, international businesses, institutional customers 
(such as pension funds and government entities/agencies) as well as other banks. Whole-
sale banks usually deal with only high value and high volume transactions. Wholesale 
banks do not have any branches as they do not serve individual customers.
RANKINGS
Rankings were determined based on the following methodology: Banks that provided in-
formation for a given indicator received a score based on their performance compared to 
their peer banks. Based on the number of banks in each category, scores ranged from 1 to 
10 for Commercial banks, 1 to 5 for Savings banks, and 1 to 2 for Wholesale banks. Banks 
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that had the best performance received a score of 1, the second best bank a 2, and so on. For 
indicators where not all banks reported, the upper limit was reduced from 10, 5 or 2 to the 
number of reporting banks. It should be noted that ANHD did not weight the indicators so 
the actual amount of the differential between two banks’ level of activity mattered less in 
our analysis than the more straightforward measure of who did more or less compared to 
their peers. Although ANHD compiled and analyzed 37 different types of data, banks were 
ranked according to the following nine indicators:
1) Percentage of Branches in Low- and Moderate-Income census tracts
2) Percentage of Branches in Low-Income census tracts
3) Percentage of Multi-Family Loans in Low- and Moderate-Income census tracts
4) Percentage of Bank Deposits Dedicated for Community Development Lending
5) Percentage of Community Development Loans to Not-for-Profit Borrowers
6) Percentage of Home Purchase Loans to Low- and Moderate-Income Borrowers
7) Percentage of Bank Deposits Dedicated to CRA-eligible Investment
8) Percentage of CRA-eligible Grants Dedicated for Affordable Housing
9) Percentage of Deposits Reserved for Philanthropy
The nine indicators were chosen to capture the spectrum of CRA-related activities of 
importance to low- and moderate-income residents as well as Community Development 
Corporations (CDCs) and the availability of data. Moreover, the selected indicators cover 
the full range of lending, investment and services, but also reflect ANHD’s belief that not 
all CRA-eligible activities are necessarily equal. For example, a community development 
loan to a not-for-profit developer demonstrates not only the bank’s commitment to build 
partnerships with local institutions, but also results in keeping these valuable resources 
under community control which ensures they will be available to residents over the long 
term. Summary tables for each activity are incorporated throughout the report and present 
banks that rank either high or low based on their performance.
After rankings were assigned for individual indicators, a bank’s aggregate score for the 
nine indicators was then divided by the number of relevant indicators they were scored on 
to determine their weighted score. Banks were then ranked 1-10 (for commercial banks), 
1-5 (for savings) or 1-2 (for wholesale) to determine their Overall Ranking. Thus, a bank 
that received a #1 ranking had the strongest record among its peer institutions across the 
indicators we examined and a commercial bank with a #10 ranking, a savings bank with a 
#5 ranking, or a wholesale bank with a #2 banking had the weakest performance respec-
tively.  At the same time, it should be noted that the rankings are not intended to charac-
terize banks as either “good” or “bad.” Rather, they are meant to provide a snapshot of how 
well New York City banks served the credit needs of LMI households and neighborhoods 
compared to their peers in 2007 and 2008.
While banks’ quantitative record is important, ANHD recognizes the significance of the 
qualitative impact of a bank’s CRA-related activities on community development, small 
THE STATE OF BANK REINVESTMENT IN NEW YORK CITY: 2009  |  ANHD 
METHODOLOGY12
businesses, financial literacy, wealth creation, and neighborhood stabilization. In fact, this 
realization was one of the driving factors behind the development of our Reinvestment 
Principles (see Appendix B). One of the common themes throughout the Principles is that 
how a bank approaches its CRA-related work is just as important as what it actually does. 
Following is a sample of those indicators that ANHD believes demonstrate a bank’s com-
mitment to not merely achieve numbers, but also make a serious effort to help build stable, 
safe, and thriving communities.   
Developing and publishing a local CRA plan. An effective CRA program needs to be 
locally-focused and flexible so as to meet changing community needs and priorities. 
In New York City, priorities change from year to year, as new issues arise, and needs 
also differ among individual neighborhoods.  ANHD has asked that all banks doing 
business in New York City develop a local CRA plan that responds to this reality. In the 
future, it is important for banks to embrace this principle.  
Creating a Centralized Community Development Group dedicated to New York City 
and staffed by a senior executive, to coordinate strategy among the bank’s various 
business lines and monitor the bank’s various CRA programs. 
Committing to expand and improve their CRA-related products on a year-over-year 
basis. It has been ANHD’s experience that leadership among the city’s banks tends 
to ebb and flow. It is the rare institution that consistently expands the amount of its 
CRA-related lending and investment and continually seeks to develop increasingly 
innovative products. Although ANHD understands that finite resources and opportu-
nities may prevent every institution from achieving record output on an annual basis, 
we do expect that banks exhibit a genuine commitment to improve their approach 
from year to year.
Working to develop the financing tools to preserve the affordability of buildings 
threatened by predatory equity and commitment to avoid destructive lending  
going forward.
Demonstrating a strong commitment to stem the rising tide of foreclosures. Over the 
past several years, millions of homeowners have faced losing their homes through 
foreclosure. While both banks and government have rolled out various initiatives to 
keep families in their homes, the primary vehicle for this effort is currently the federal 
Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP). Based on monthly reports issued by 
the U.S. Treasury, it is possible to examine which banks doing business in New York 
City have modified the most number of mortgage loans. The report comments on the 
record of some of New York City’s largest banks based on this data as well as the expe-
rience of our member organizations that provide foreclosure prevention counseling. 
•
•
•
•
•
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If these qualitative indicators had been factored into the analysis, the Overall Rankings 
would surely be different. For example, there are numerous banks that have a disappoint-
ing track record in facilitating foreclosure prevention. Had these indicators been included, 
their overall performance would be less strong. In the future, ANHD will incorporate these 
qualitative indicators into the Overall Rankings. For the purpose of the 2009 report, we 
highlight throughout those banks who have demonstrated a strong record in these areas.
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Structural changes in the banking industry over the last decade—including growth and 
consolidation—have led to a substantial shift in the way banks’ approach CRA-motivated 
lending and investment. Much of the growth is due to banks being permitted to conduct 
both commercial and investment banking, which was enabled through the repeal of the 
Glass-Steagall Act in 1999.12  The other factor driving this growth has been the consoli-
dation of the industry that has occurred with the widespread practice 
of acquiring and merging with other institutions.13  The combination of 
fewer banks serving New York City and those that remain being “mega-
banks” has had negative consequences on the ability of banks to serve the 
unique and varied credit needs of low- and moderate-income communi-
ties across the five boroughs. 
This is especially true for those large institutions that have begun to incor-
porate their CRA programs into mainstream business units, a change that 
began in 1995 when the regulations were rewritten to emphasize produc-
tion over process. Mark Willis, a research fellow at New York University’s 
Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy and former community 
development banker, describes the implications of this shift. He says, “The 
more that mainstream units have built their business around high-volume 
products, the more difficult it is to develop products or services expressly 
for the LMI marketplace.” 14
Community Development Corporations (CDCs), the non-for-profit orga-
nizations at the front lines of neighborhood stabilization and revitalization, have experi-
enced this shift dramatically. Although several banks have utilized their community devel-
opment teams to work effectively with CDCs in the creation of successful loan products 
over the past thirty years, this system has been impacted as some banks have grown. Since 
these loans generally are not considered cookie cutter deals, the lender looks at communi-
ty development deals as more difficult and expensive to do.  Chris Kui, Executive Director 
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of Asian Americans for Equality, explains what is necessary to reverse this trend. 
He says, “A genuine commitment to meet the credit needs of our community will 
demystify our deals, improve our communities and clarify to banks how working 
with community groups will be financially beneficial to the institution.” 
The trends in the way CRA-eligible lending has been carried out in the recent 
past directly refute a common assertion that we have heard from the banking 
industry over the past year, which is that the foreclosure and credit crisis are 
responsible for the reduction in the volume of reinvestment and the types of 
products the banks offer. While volatility in the larger economy and a weaker 
balance sheet surely affected banks’ ability to lend and invest, these factors 
do not fully explain or justify the significant reduction in core CRA-relative 
activities as these reductions were already well under way by the time hous-
ing bubbled popped in mid-2008. Indeed, many of these deals take years to 
work their way through the development and underwriting process so it is un-
likely that activity would drop off so quickly after the credit crunch began.
There are several other reasons as well. First, community development is coun-
tercyclical, which means the private market’s interest in projects that have a pub-
lic purpose and access to public subsidy intensifies when the economy overall 
weakens. Indeed, the New York City’s Department of Housing Preservation and 
Development and Housing Development Corporation maintained its level of in-
vestment in affordable housing and community development initiatives and even 
expanded their appetite for private debt and equity due to new opportunities that 
arose due to the softening real estate market. Second, a bank’s affirmative obliga-
tion to help meet credit needs is not tied to a bank’s profitability, but rather to the 
benefits they receive as chartered institutions. Finally, as will be discussed further 
in the next section, deposits for the majority of New York City banks actually 
grew over this two year period which signals they had more deployable capital 
available to serve this important market.15    
Certainly, ANHD finds it disturbing that many banks have used the recent reces-
sion to excuse their reduced commitment to serving low- and moderate-income 
communities. Banks should be working hard to develop creative, cost effective 
strategies for keeping owners and renters in their homes and stabilizing neigh-
borhoods. 
DEPOSITS
As explained in our Reinvestment Principles, many of ANHD’s benchmarks 
for lending, investment, and philanthropy are tied to the size of a bank’s local 
deposits.16 Customer deposits constitute the most secure and cheapest source 
of capital for banks. Indeed, in addition to access to cheaper borrowing rates 
from the Federal Reserve Bank’s Discount Window,17 one of the primary rea-
sons behind Goldman Sachs’ and Morgan Stanley’s decision to become Bank 
   Banks had  
an even greater  
responsibility to 
meet the credit 
needs of working 
class residents in 
2008 than in  
previous years. 
12  New York City’s 10 largest banks accounted 
for 72.4% of the market share for branches in 
2008 compared to 61.8% in 1998. FDIC Sum-
mary of Deposits.
13 Eleven of the city’s 25 largest banks in 1998 
were acquired and merged with other banks in 
the ten year period ending in 2008. Community 
Development At-Risk: The Troubled Future of 
Bank Reinvestment in New York City, ANHD. 
Available at www.anhd.org 
14  Willis, Mark. “It’s the Rating, Stupid: A 
Banker’s Perspective on the CRA,” Revisiting 
the CRA: Perspectives on the Future of the Com-
munity Reinvestment Act. Published by Federal 
Reserve Bank of San Francisco. Available at: 
http://www.frbsf.org/publications/community/
cra/cra_past_successes_future_ 
opportunities.pdf
15  Generally, deposits are measured as of 
June 30. Therefore, this increase does not 
include TARP funds since Congress did not  
authorize the first release of funds until 
October 3, 2008. 
16 Another widely used benchmark for esti-
mating how much community development 
lending a bank is required to do to receive a 
passing grade on its CRA exam is based on 
the amount of Tier 1 Capital the bank pos-
sesses. While this may be the best indicator 
for determining the entire bank’s commitment, 
ANHD believes that a banks local deposit base 
is a better method for establishing reasonable 
levels of lending, investment and philanthropy 
in New York City.
17 Marsico, Richard D. Democratizing Capital: 
The History, Law and Reform of the Community 
Reinvestment Act. Durham: Carolina Academic 
Press, 2005.
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Holding Companies was access to deposits of more traditional customers. As 
a city of over 8 million people and the financial capital of the world, New York 
certainly provides institutions doing business here access to a lot of stable, 
cheap deposits.
Total deposits for 17 of the city’s largest banks increased from $408.9 billion 
to $450.8 billion—a one year increase of 10.2%. Only three banks reported 
a smaller deposit base in 2008 compared to 2007. Thus, viewed through this 
lens, ANHD believes it is reasonable to conclude that banks had an even 
greater responsibility to meet the credit needs of working class residents in 
2008 than in previous years. 
Although an increase in deposits should be seen as a positive development 
for the economy as a whole, how the depository institution re-deploys that 
capital in a local market is equally important. As the following examples il-
lustrate, however, for numerous banks there seems to be an inverse relationship 
between the size of their deposit base and the amount of lending and investment 
they commit to their assessment area. For example, Citibank saw an increase in 
deposits of $6.2 billion (+14.5%) but authorized double-digit decreases to its multi-
family lending, community development lending, and CRA-qualified investment, 
which will be discussed in greater detail in subsequent sections. Additionally, JP-
Morgan Chase, TD Bank North, and M&T, despite larger deposit bases, all re-
duced at least some of their lending or investment over this period. 
While this evidence suggests that the community is not necessarily better served 
as banks’ deposits grow, individual customers are not necessarily being adequate-
ly compensated by large deposit-holding institutions either. Recent analysis by 
The New York Times found that banks with more than $100 billion of assets paid 
an annual interest rate on deposits of nearly one percentage point less than banks 
with less than $10 billion of assets. The New York Times estimates that the lower 
interest rate payments translate to an annual savings of $30 billion for the na-
tion’s 10 largest banks.18  Thus, despite large banks’ claim that an ever increasing 
size and branch network allow them to best meet the “convenience and needs” of 
their customers, it is clear that this may not include the interest rates they pay on 
deposits. The fact that of over 88% of New York City deposits are controlled by the 
city’s ten largest banks, all of which have more than $100 billion in assets, demon-
strates how many residents are affected by these lower rates. 
STAFFING
It has been ANHD’s experience that the banks with the most effective CRA pro-
grams reflect a broad institutional commitment to CRA, which begins with lead-
ership that is knowledgeable about, engaged in, and committed to a bank’s CRA 
programs. In addition to committed leadership, strong CRA programs require the 18  Cox, Rob and Lauren Silva Laughlin. “An-
other Advantage For Biggest Banks,” The New 
York Times. March 29, 2010.
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bank to have adequate levels of staff with appropriate expertise dedicated to each 
of its local markets. Regrettably, over this two year period, there was a 19.2% re-
duction in the number of community development staff serving New York City for 
the seven banks who reported. Interestingly, information regarding their staffing 
was one of the areas that banks were least likely to report, which may signal that 
actual reductions in head count were more drastic.   
As the footprint of a bank’s service area expands due to mergers and acquisi-
tions, its staff is stretched to cover new geographies, often without increased 
resources. It is only natural that this leads to a situation where staff has grown 
increasingly distant from the local community and less knowledgeable about 
local credit needs and resources including public affordable housing and 
community development programs. This has been one of the most troubling 
trends identified by ANHD’s members. 
Eugene Ludwig, former Comptroller of the Currency, acknowledged this 
trend in a recent report. He says, “One significant, but frequently ignored, 
consequence of the transformation to national financial markets is that local 
markets and local neighborhoods receive less individualized attention.” 19
A related change that has harmed the effectiveness of a bank’s CRA strategy 
was shifting who within the bank is responsible for meeting the institution’s 
obligations. In the past, the bank’s Director of Community Development typi-
cally reported to the President or another senior executive. Currently, most 
community development and CRA staff report to the head of a bank’s Commercial 
Lending unit who view CRA-related activities through the narrow rubric of profit-
ability.  In New York City, we have witnessed firsthand how moving specialized 
community development groups into the bank’s mainstream business units has 
had a detrimental effect on the availability of designated staff who are knowledge-
able about the local market, know how to get unconventional deals underwritten 
in a safe and sound manner, and serve as a catalyst for innovation.   
Michelle de la Uz, ANHD’s Board President and Executive Director of the Fifth 
Avenue Committee, commented on how this change has impacted her partner-
ships with banks. She said, “The trend in moving community development into 
other units at the bank often means involving staff from around the United States 
in a particular deal -  that means you are not only just explaining the broad points 
or goals of your particular development project but literally educating them about 
the New York City housing market broadly and the specific neighborhood housing 
market that the development project is in.  If you are New Yorker, you know that 
a project in Upper Manhattan will be different and face different challenges and 
opportunities than a project in Red Hook, Brooklyn, but for someone in California 
or Ohio, those differences are not obvious.” 
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19  Ludwig, Eugene A., James Kamihachi and 
Laura Toh. “The Community Reinvestment Act: 
Past Successes and Future Opportunities,” 
Revisiting the CRA: Perspectives on the Future 
of the Community Reinvestment Act. Published 
by Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco and 
available at: http://www.frbsf.org/publications/
community/cra/cra_past_successes_future_
opportunities.pdf
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Another consequence of these changing staffing patterns is less innovation. Mark Willis 
points out that, “Even where separate, specialized units continue to exist, they are finding 
it increasingly difficult to attract the required resources to develop new products.”
That being said, some institutions such as Capital One have built a strong team that is 
rooted in New York City. ANHD member groups have reported a highly productive work-
ing relationship with the staff that make up the bank’s community development group. 
Not only is the group very knowledgeable about the New York City market, it is extremely 
dedicated to going the extra mile in getting deals done. While many banks have been con-
tent to stand on the sidelines in this tight credit market, Capital One has identified lend-
ing and investment opportunities that contribute to both the construction and preserva-
tion of affordable housing as well as the stabilization and revitalization of neighborhoods 
plagued by foreclosures and disinvestment. 
Furthermore, since Capital One’s entry into the New York City market in 2006, the bank 
has been a key partner in not only lending and investing in neighborhoods across the city, 
but also a prominent supporter of housing policy that benefits working class residents 
of both rental and owner-occupied housing. It is clear that Capital One’s senior leader-
ship has integrated the bank’s CRA strategy into all of its business lines and aligned its 
reinvestment goals with its commitment to serve its shareholders. ANHD also applauds 
the leadership role that Capital One has taken in strategic partnerships including philan-
thropic collaboratives and affordable housing advocacy coalitions. ANHD believes that 
the bank’s active involvement in these initiatives represents a model for other institutions 
looking to provide core community development services. 
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT LENDING
Community development lending fuels economic development and is the engine that en-
ables the construction of new affordable housing and community facilities. The quality of 
New York City’s housing stock and the vitality of its neighborhoods depend on the avail-
ability of this capital. Although some banks have remained committed partners, the indus-
try as a whole is reducing its financial investment and seems less interested in responding 
to local needs through the crafting of innovative approaches.
HIGHEST % OF DEPOSITS DEDICATED TO CD LENDING 
COMMERCIAL BANKS
RANK BANK
M&T
Valley National
Banco Popular
1
2
3
3.85%
3.26%
Table 1  
3.98%
HIGHEST % OF DEPOSITS  
DEDICATED TO CD LENDING
SAVINGS BANKS
RANK BANK
Signature
Apple Bank
Astoria Savings
1
2
3
0.37%
0.16%
2.5%
HIGHEST % OF DEPOSITS  
DEDICATED TO CD LENDING
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Between 2007 and 2008, there was a 29% reduction in the number of community develop-
ment loans originated (from 507 to 360) in New York City. In dollar terms, the decrease 
was 20.2% (from $2.8 billion to $2.24 billion). And the actual reduction may be even great-
er for several reasons. First, while JPMorgan Chase reported a $68.2 million increase in 
its community development lending from 2007 to 2008 (from $699.8 million to $768 mil-
lion), ANHD expected the increase to be at least $103.8 million to maintain the level of 
lending that Chase and Washington Mutual committed the previous year. Indeed, one of 
ANHD’s Reinvestment Principles regarding mergers is that the amount of lending of the 
combined institution must not be below the level of activity of the two individual institu-
tions. Thus, in actuality, there was an additional $35.6 million decrease between 2007 and 
2008 that is not reflected in Appendix A.
Second, these figures cover just 14 of the city’s largest banks. The fact that several banks 
failed to include this data in their response may reflect their preference to conceal a 
decrease in the number and value of loans they made. Nevertheless, these reductions 
amount to very large sums of money. As Table 1 illustrates, however, it is just a small per-
centage of the banks’ deposit base and demonstrates how little of the banks’ business is 
focused on community development. 
Interestingly, wholesale banks—whose performance assessment places greater value on 
the institution’s community development-related activities—have similarly weak records 
in terms of deploying their asset base to make loans for community development. For 
example, Bank of New York Mellon and Deutsche Bank only lent 0.66% and 0.46% of 
their gross New York City deposits respectively for community development purposes. If 
Bank of New York Mellon lent at the same rate as M&T for instance, the bank’s commu-
nity development lending would increase from $265 million to $1.6 billion – a meaningful 
increase by any measure.
Although the low percentage of deposits dedicated to community development lending 
is disappointing, the trend of banks reducing their community development lending in 
the recent past may be more compelling. Other than Bank of America, which increased 
its community development lending by a meaningful 154.3% (from $104 million to $264.5 
million), most banks doing business in the city drastically reduced the amount of their 
lending. For both commercial and savings banks, Table 2 demonstrates those institutions 
that reduced their lending by the greatest percentage over this period. 
LARGEST % REDUCTION IN $ OF CD LENDING (2008)
COMMERCIAL BANKS
RANK BANK
TD Bank
Citi 
Banco Popular
1
2
3
-74.5%
-63.8%
Table 2  
-87.7%
% CHANGE
SAVINGS BANKS
RANK BANK
Sovereign/ Santander
Apple Bank 
1
2 -36.5%
-66.0%
% CHANGE
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For the three commercial banks, these reductions amount to a decrease of $829.1 million. 
The savings banks accounted for a $27 million cut. The two wholesale banks we analyzed, 
BONY Mellon and Deutsche Bank, raised their community development budgets by $48.1 
million. However, this increase is dwarfed by the $568.4 million in community development 
financing that evaporated in the city between 2007 and 2008 across the industry.
 
While these reductions are extremely troubling, there is more to the story. The integration 
of community development groups into the bank’s commercial lending or investment bank 
has had a myriad of consequences. One of the most distressing from ANHD’s perspective 
is the lack of staff who are knowledgeable about local subsidy programs and developers 
who are committed to serving the community over the long term. This is evident when con-
sidering that the number of loans made to not-for-profit developers fell by over 33 percent 
between 2007 and 2008. 
From a neighborhood stabilization perspective, loans to not-for-profit developers are es-
pecially important as these developers commit to maintaining the affordability perma-
nently, working with households that are rebuilding their credit, and building truly livable 
units that meet the needs of local residents in terms of unit size and deeper affordability. 
ANHD’s Reinvestment Principles recommend that banks make at least 50% of their com-
munity development loans with not-for-profit organizations – a reasonable threshold given 
the nature and purpose of these deals. As Table 3 notes, only three of the banks we ana-
lyzed have met this threshold.  
Another result of this integration is that many banks seem to be competing for the largest, 
most straightforward deals with the highest capacity or high volume developers. While this 
may be defensible from a business perspective, it is not from the viewpoint of community 
accountability as there are many projects that are not receiving support which have the 
potential to make a tremendous positive impact on the lives of low- and moderate-income 
residents and neighborhoods.
Regrettably, ANHD and our community-based housing groups recently have heard the 
following message from banks, “The cost of processing loans of this size is prohibitive; 
LARGEST % OF CD LOANS TO NOT-FOR-PROFIT DEVELOPERS (2008)
ALL BANKS
RANK BANK
JPMorgan Chase 
Sovereign/ Santander 
Deutsche Bank
1
2
3
100.0%
100.0%
Table 3  
100.0%
% CHANGE
4
5
Banco Popular
Capital One  25.0%
 38.9%
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it costs us the same to process your loan as it costs us to process a multi-million dollar 
loan that will make us more money.”  Jim Buckley, Executive Director of the University 
Neighborhood Housing Program, is troubled by this justification. He says, “We heard this 
from banks in the 1970s when we were looking for $50,000 boiler loans and we’ve been 
hearing it from the banks again in 2010 and the preceding years when we were looking 
for $500,000+ rehabilitation loans.  Our response is still the same.  These are the kinds of 
loans that we need in our communities and these are the kinds of loans that are good risks 
that will be repaid.”
For example, New York City’s Participation Loan Program (PLP) is a core source of fi-
nancing for owners of affordable housing who are trying to maintain their properties in 
a state of good repair. Through PLP, the city’s housing agency provides up to $100,000 per 
unit at a 1 percent interest rate, which is combined with private financing from a partici-
pating lender, to deliver a composite financing cost that is below market. These deals are 
extremely low risk for the private lenders given the city’s financial stake in the project. 
Many lenders, however, feel that the amount of time it takes to underwrite these deals is 
too burdensome given the relatively small size of the loans. Thus, Banco Popular, Bank 
of America, BPD Bank, Carver Savings Bank, Citibank and the Community Preservation 
Corporation are the only lenders still participating and anecdotal reports are that many of 
these institutions have pulled back substantially. Without private financing, many owners 
cannot maintain their properties which leads to unsafe, unhealthy living conditions for 
tenants and stressed neighborhoods. 
MULTI-FAMILY LENDING
More than two thirds of New Yorkers live in multi-family apartment build-
ings and almost nine in ten low- and moderate-income households in the 
city are renters. Given this reality, ANHD holds that if a bank is serious 
about establishing a comprehensive, effective CRA-strategy for New York 
City, multi-family lending must be a core activity.20 ANHD believes it 
is unacceptable that two of the city’s three largest banks have recently 
ended their multi-family lending businesses because it was not profitable 
enough. As the recent economic turmoil has made apparent, banks’ de-
sire for huge, short-term returns has often led them to take on very risky 
deals. Committing to a meaningful amount of long-term lending—in addi-
tion to ensuring credit is available to owners serving so many of the city’s 
working class residents—would provide both a reasonable and less risky return.
ANHD would like to see these institutions return to the multi-family lending business as 
soon as possible and commit to making multi-family loans that are sustainable. 
Given these high-profile departures from the multi-family lending business and the overall 
consolidation in the industry, it is not surprising that there was a substantial reduction in 
this activity. In fact, between 2007 and 2008, there was a 16% reduction in the number of 
multi-family loans originated (from 1,398 to 1,174) in New York City. In dollar terms, the 
decrease was 24.2% (from $5.3 billion to $4.0 billion). These figures do include Washing-
    ANHD would like 
to see these institu-
tions return to the 
multi-family lending 
business as soon as 
possible and com-
mit to making multi-
family loans that are 
sustainable.
ANHD  |  EVIDENCE OF RETRENCHMENT
 PART I 23
ton Mutual’s billion dollar multi-family lending program, which JPMorgan Chase 
decided not to continue when they bought the troubled bank. In 2007, Washington 
Mutual originated 791 multi-family loans worth approximately $1.2 billion, but the 
combined institution originated only $3.25 million in multi-family loans in 2008. 
Furthermore, the reductions in multi-family lending are even more disconcerting 
when one considers that much of the “lost” loans were in low- and moderate-in-
come neighborhoods. For example, there was a 23.5% reduction (from 900 to 715) 
in the number and a 31.8% drop (from $2.9 billion to $2.0 billion) in dollars of 
multi-family loans made in LMI tracts over the two year period. In this way, the 
case of HSBC presents an interesting dilemma. While the bank should be applaud-
ed for its 100% increase in the number of multi-family loans made between 2007 
and 2008, the expansion did not result in better service to low- or moderate-income 
communities as none of the additional loans were in target neighborhoods. Table 4 
illustrates those institutions that have the lowest percentage of multi-family lend-
ing in LMI tracts. Furthermore, the table details how savings banks tend to have 
a much greater share of their loans in low- and moderate-income neighborhoods 
than larger retail banks.
Based on these developments and low interest rates, it is clear that there are le-
gitimate opportunities for banks of all sizes to enter this market. A recent article 
in The Real Deal describes a very competitive market made up of existing and 
new players including New York Community Bank, Dime Savings Bank of Wil-
liamsburg, M&T Bank, Capital One, TD Bank, Wachovia, Signature Bank, Astoria 
Federal and Investors Savings Bank of New Jersey. Although it is encouraging to 
see new entrants into this much-needed sector, advocates do not view all lenders 
or lending as equal. 
Indeed, ANHD has consistently called for lending that is both safe and sound and 
has a positive impact on the city’s rent regulated housing stock and working class 
neighborhoods. However, the experiences of New York Community Bank and 
Deutsche Bank represent exactly the type of lending we do not want given its de-
stabilizing effect on tenants and working class neighborhoods. 
LOWEST % MULTI-FAMILY LENDING IN LMI TRACTS (2008)
COMMERCIAL BANKS
RANK BANK
M&T
HSBC
Banco Popular
1
2
3
29.2%
33.3%
Table 4  
21.1%
LOWEST % OF MULTI-FAMILY  
LENDING IN LMI TRACTS
SAVINGS BANKS
RANK BANK
Apple Bank
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Astoria Savings
1
2
3
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0.16%
27.8%
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LENDING IN LMI TRACTS
20  Multi-family loans are commercial mort-
gages and therefore considered permanent 
financing. For the purpose of CRA reporting, 
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For the past two years, ANHD has been working to protect tenants living in build-
ings owned by predatory equity-backed landlords across the city.21 Many of the 
disreputable owners operating in the Bronx obtained financing from New York 
Community Bank and Deutsche Bank, which were either negligent in failing to 
recognize the unsupportable nature of the loan or complicit in the business mod-
el to push out rent regulated tenants in favor of more affluent residents. Unlike 
Deutsche Bank, which did not appear to seek CRA credit for these loans, 
the fact that New York Community Bank lent developers the money to 
enable these purchases and got CRA credit for the destructive loans is 
especially alarming. Moreover, New York Community Bank has refused 
to take responsibility for the destructive loans they originated. The bank 
has been completely unresponsive to requests from tenants and advo-
cates to meet or intervene with landlords to ensure repairs are made in 
a timely and adequate fashion. 
In 2006, New York Community Bank, the city’s largest provider of multi-
family loans originated more than $2 billion in multi-family loans, ap-
proximately 74% of which were in low- and moderate-income neigh-
borhoods. And the bank is planning to provide close to $3 billion in 
financing in the multi-factor sector in 2010.22 Bank regulators and elected officials 
must get a commitment from New York Community  Bank that they will not origi-
nate these destructive loans going forward and make a meaningful effort to ensure 
current properties remain in good repair.  
The data on Deutsche Bank’s multi-family lending is less straightforward. The 
bank’s Community Development Finance Group, the department responsible for 
meeting the institution’s CRA obligations, did not originate any multi-family loans 
during this period. However, Deutsche Bank Mortgage Capital,23  another depart-
ment that provides financing for commercial real estate deals, originated and se-
curitized millions of dollars in multi-family loans in low- and moderate-income 
neighborhoods. ANHD has obtained information on many of these deals that are 
clearly underwritten with the intention to displace current tenants. For example, 
one of these deals was a $35 million loan to Millbank Real Estate Services, Inc., 
a Los Angeles-based company, to buy ten buildings in the Bronx. The properties 
went into foreclosure in March 2009, are in poor condition, and have seen high 
rates of tenant turnover.
In ANHD’s experience, the attempt by Deutsche Bank to distinguish between loans 
that have a community development focus and those that are purely profit moti-
vated is a departure from how most banks approach the categorization of CRA-
eligible activity as they try to maximize the volume they report to the regulators. 
Given the spirit of CRA, it is puzzling to ANHD that one part of the bank could be 
applauded for its community development efforts while another is playing a very 
damaging role. ANHD believes regulators must examine the entire institution’s 
record to more accurately determine the qualitative impact of an institution’s lend-
ing, investment and services.
    ANHD has obtained 
information on many 
of these deals that are 
clearly underwritten 
with the intention  
to displace current  
tenants.
21 Predatory Equity: Evolution Of A Crisis. The 
Threat To New York’s Affordable Rental Housing: 
2005 – 2009. November 2009. 
Available at www.anhd.org.
22  Stoler, Michael. “Lenders Bullish In Pro-
viding Financing For Multi-Family Housing”, 
The Real Deal. April 6, 2010.  
http://therealdeal.com/newyork/articles/lend-
ers-bullish-in-providing-financing-for-multi-
family-buildings-according-to-michael-stoler
23  Deutsche Bank Mortgage Capital Bro-
chure. Available at:   
http://www.corporatefinance.db.com/home/
docs/DBMC_brochure_final.pdf 
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For these reasons, regulators must not view every multi-family loan made in a LMI 
neighborhood equally as some loans better meet the needs of poor and working 
class residents and communities than others. Additionally, given what is currently 
happening with many of these overleveraged properties and poorly underwritten 
loans, one needs to question how and if they passed the regulators’ “safety and 
soundness” test as there are many simple, straightforward ways to determine the 
soundness of a loan. For example, one primary indicator of default danger that 
regulators should be examining is the Debt Service Coverage Ratio (DSCR), which 
measures the amount of cash flow available to meet annual interest and principal 
payments on debt. 
ANHD’s analysis of loan servicer reports on mortgage-backed securities in 
which some predatory equity mortgages are held reveals that, as of December 
2008, the average DSCR of predatory equity financing is .55. This means that only 
$0.55 in income is available for every dollar of debt owed. Despite this incred-
ibly low DSCR, neither the bank nor the regulator questioned the merit of these 
loans or the impact they would have on residents and neighborhoods. Clearly, 
more needs to be done on multiple levels to prevent these speculative loans 
going forward. 
HOME PURCHASE LENDING AND  
FORECLOSURE PREVENTION
New York City has a large homeowner population; approximately 1/3 of our resi-
dents are homeowners, including over 325,000 lower-income households.24 As 
such, we have a continuing need for responsible home mortgage lending. However, 
as the Furman Center’s 2009 State of New York City’s Housing and Neighborhoods 
report details, the number of first lien, conventional home purchase loans origi-
nated in New York City dropped by over 33% from 2007 to 2008. 25
 
This reduction led to a decline in both the rate of home purchase lending for every 
one of the City’s 59 community districts and the number of conventional home 
purchase loans to borrowers of each race. Black and Hispanic borrowers were 
especially negatively impacted. For instance, blacks make up about 23% of city 
households but only received 11.1% of home purchase loans. Likewise, Hispan-
ics, which represent 24.1% of the population, were responsible for just 10% of all 
originations. 
Home Purchase Loan products that facilitate new homeownership opportunities 
are especially crucial to ensuring low- and moderate-income households have the 
credit they need to achieve the American dream. Table 5 below illustrates those 
banks that have made the best effort to ensure a meaningful percentage of their 
mortgage lending serves LMI households. Across the industry, however, ANHD 
believes there are few lenders, if any that should be considered a standard bearer 
in serving this population. And it is important to point out that this lack of lending 
24  Beveridge, Andrew. “Housing Squeeze 
Shows No Sign of Easing,” Gotham Gazette. 
May 15, 2008.  
http://www.gothamgazette.com/article/
demographics/20080515/5/2524
25  New York University Furman Center for 
Real Estate and Urban Policy. 2009 State of 
New York City’s Housing and Neighborhoods. 
Available at: 
http://furmancenter.org/files/sotc/
SOC_2009_Full.pdf
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to credit-worthy borrowers, coupled with a rising tide of foreclosures, is having a 
de-stabilizing effect on certain neighborhoods where abandoned properties have 
caused surrounding property values to fall. 
 
More specifically, ANHD’s Reinvestment Principles urge banks to commit to mort-
gage lending to low-income households that is proportionate to the percent of 
low-income households in the city as a whole. Given that about 10% of house-
holds in the city are occupied by low-income owners, ANHD would like to see 10% 
of a bank’s home purchase loans being originated to these households. Of the 9 
servicers that provided ANHD with mortgage data, Citi is the only bank that comes 
close to this threshold with 6.4% of its home purchase loans being originated with 
low-income borrowers. Furthermore, Citi’s 362 loans represent a staggering 85% 
of the home purchase loans made to low-income households in 2008.
There is a model for serving these households in a sustainable fashion. Both 
Neighborhood Housing Services of New York (NHS) and the New York Mortgage 
Coalition (NYMC) provide financial workshops, pre-purchase counseling, and 
access to competitive, fixed-rate loans and payment assistance in the form of 
closing cost grants and down payment subsidies.26
In 2008, community-based housing organizations in the Mortgage Coalition part-
nered with New York City-based banks to originate over 400 mortgages for first-
time homebuyers. While the percentage of LMI mortgages originated with home-
buyers counseled by Mortgage Coalition members  increased from 65.6% to 67.3% 
between 2007 and 2008, the percent of home purchase loans made to low-income 
borrowers fell from 25.9% to 21.7%. The reason for this decrease parallels what 
we have seen in the multi-family and community development sector – banks are 
less able to create and offer products that, while marginally more complex, have a 
tremendous positive impact on working class communities. It is important to point 
26  NYMC is a not-for-profit collaboration of 
financial institutions and community-based 
housing agencies dedicated to helping low- to 
moderate-income families in New York, Long 
Island and Westchester County achieve the 
dream of responsible homeownership. The 
community groups participating in the NYMC 
include Asian Americans for Equality, Cypress 
Hills Local Development Corporation, Harlem 
Congregations for Community Improvement, 
Neighbors Helping Neighbors, Pratt Area 
Community Council, Housing Partnership 
Development Corporation, Housing Action 
Council, and the Long Island Housing Partner-
ship. Participating lenders include Amalgam-
ated, Astoria Federal Savings & Loan, Bank of 
America, Capital One, Citi, HSBC, JPMorgan 
Chase and M&T. http://www.nymc.org/home
27  ANHD is presenting data for the first 
quarter of 2010 for several reasons. First, it 
is the most current information we have con-
cerning banks’ efforts to keep homeowners in 
their homes. Second, we did not request loan 
modification data from the banks in either our 
2007 or 2008 request. Going forward, we will 
expand the request to include this information. 
Additionally, it is important to acknowledge 
that this data covers a larger geographic area 
as it represents the banks’ activity in the MSA, 
not just New York City.
28   Making Home Affordable, March Loan 
Modification Report.  
Available at: http://makinghomeaffordable.
gov/pr_04142010b.html 
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out that because of mandatory and comprehensive pre-purchase counseling, these are 
incredibly safe loans. In fact, the foreclosure rate on the 5,000+ loans originated through 
NYMC is less than 1%.
In addition to a need for affordable home purchase loans, including re-
sponsible products targeted to LMI borrowers and to first-time home-
buyers, it is also important that banks have products and programs in 
place to preserve homeownership and prevent foreclosure. 
The reasons for the foreclosure crisis are well-documented so this re-
port will not try to repeat them. However, it is important to acknowledge 
the millions of homeowners across the country facing foreclosure and 
discuss the quantitative record of banks related to modifying these un-
affordable loans.27 According to data associated with the federal Home 
Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), which is the primary vehicle 
for conducting loan modifications, there were almost 62,000 active loan 
modifications in the New York metropolitan statistic area as of March 
2010.28 As a percentage of eligible loans to be modified, Bank of America 
had the worst record of modification of the banks ANHD examined. Of Bank of America’s 
approximately 1.1 million eligible loans, only 26% in March and 24% in February were in 
either an active or permanent trial. Table 6 demonstrates that many of its peer banks had 
much better track records.
Even among those banks who have demonstrated a stronger willingness to offer their 
clients a trial or permanent modification, there have been pervasive reports of lost pa-
perwork, unresponsive staff, unreasonable delays, and a general reluctance to take 
the necessary steps to achieve a sustainable outcome.  Indeed, there is a sense among 
borrowers, counselors, and attorneys that obstacles are being put in place that make 
it typical for some borrowers to wait more than a year to secure a modification, if 
at all. 
   Banks must  
establish consistent 
policies, develop a 
more streamlined, 
fair review process, 
and assign case 
managers to work 
on an application 
throughout the  
entire process.
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Chhaya CDC, a community-based non-profit organi-
zation serving South Asian Americans and a member 
of both ANHD and the Mortgage Coalition, is at the 
forefront of providing foreclosure prevention counsel-
ing services and helped more than 100 families in 2009 
alone. The Chen’s were one of those families who con-
tacted Chhaya in early 2009 after falling behind on their 
mortgage payments. Ms. Chen was laid off from her 
job as the manager of a bookstore and her husband, a 
cab driver, was unable to work due to an accident. The 
Chen’s, who have two teenage children, have owned 
their home in Queens Village since 2005 and had a per-
fect payment record before their employment problems 
surfaced.   
With the help of Shama Mubdi, Chhaya’s Housing 
Counselor, the Chen’s were granted a 3 month HAMP 
trial. They made all of their payments during the trial, 
which ended up lasting almost ten months. Throughout the extended trial, Ms. 
Mubdi worked with the Chen’s to ensure all necessary paperwork was filed in 
a timely fashion and tried to follow up regularly with the bank. However, they 
rarely worked with the same bank representative, were told multiple times that 
documents they had submitted were not received, and that the bank’s policies 
had changed. For example, while Mr. Chen’s income was counted as eligible when 
the trial began, the bank later claimed his income was not eligible and denied the 
Chen’s permanent modification due to “insufficient income.” Ms. Mubdi said these 
delays and unfulfilled promises have a very damaging psychological impact on the 
borrowers who often cannot see an end to this financial and emotional limbo.
With the help of legal representation provided by the Urban Justice Center (UJC), 
the Chen’s—along with two other borrowers—filed a lawsuit against JPMorgan 
Chase on the grounds of “breach of contract.” Carmela Huang, staff attorney at 
UJC, explained that legal precedent has been established for this strategy in 
places like Washington and Ohio, and is confident a favorable resolution will be 
achieved here. She said, “My clients have fulfilled their end of the contract by do-
ing everything JPMorgan told them was necessary to obtain a permanent modifi-
cation. The bank is now responsible for holding up their end of the contract.” Ms. 
Huang added, “It is unfortunate that it takes legal action to get the bank motivated 
to grant the modification in a more timely fashion.”   
Ms. Mubdi, the housing counselor, says, “In order to improve their track record on perma-
nent modifications, banks must establish consistent policies, develop a more streamlined, 
fair review process, and assign case managers to work on an application throughout the 
entire process.” Given the huge taxpayer-funded bailouts that these institutions received, 
Table 7
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29  Enterprise Community Partners, About  
the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit. 
Available at: http://www.enterprisecommunity.
com/products_and_services/lihtc.asp
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these seem like reasonable requests the banks should adopt to 
ensure permanent modifications are made in a meaningful and 
timely way.
CRA-QUALIFIED INVESTMENT
Low Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTCs) are central el-
ements of the financing for approximately 90% of all af-
fordable housing development.29 Investment in LIHTC is 
one area that receives frequent attention when discussing 
how the current recession has impacted affordable housing 
and community development. For example, as banks began 
posting multi-billon dollar losses, their national demand 
for tax credits fell sharply and prices soon dropped from 
record highs to near record lows. Much of this drop can be 
explained by the fact that the three largest investors his-
torically have either pulled out altogether (i.e., Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac) or became a more minor player (Citi). The 
diminished investor demand is worrisome as a lower price 
means either fewer units of affordable housing will be built 
or the units will not be affordable to those most in need. 
Thus, as will be discussed in Part III, several legislative and 
administrative fixes have been proposed to stimulate the 
tax credit market.
As Table 7 illustrates, however, tax credit investment among 
New York City banks rose – in some cases substantially – 
between 2007 and 2008. For the eight banks that provid-
ed data, total investment increased from $624.2 million to 
$794.2 million—a jump of 27.2%. One explanation for this 
growth could be that 2008 was too early to capture the de-
creased demand and that 2009 data will reveal just how far demand dropped in New York 
City. Another reason may be that as the headquarter city of many of these banks, their 
interest in tax credit investment is more stable than in areas outside of their assessment 
area. And the reason for BONY Mellon’s drastic increase is rooted in the bank changing 
its designation from a commercial bank to a wholesale bank, which tend to rely more on 
investments to fulfill their community development obligations.  
A few banks, especially those with weaker appetites for new tax credit investment, have 
instituted debt-equity programs that are designed to use proprietary funds to invest in 
deals that the bank is also financing. Although ANHD applauds these institutions’ com-
mitment to investing in affordable housing, this structure may put not-for-profit develop-
ers at a disadvantage as they will have to compete for investors. 
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PHILANTHROPY
CRA-related philanthropy has played and continues to serve a crucial role in the 
ability of community groups to further their missions of creating and preserving 
safe, decent affordable housing and neighborhoods for low- and moderate-income 
New Yorkers. 
Between 2007 and 2008, CRA-eligible grant making increased by a sizable 17.9% 
(from $33.9 million to $39.96 million) among the 13 banks providing information. 
If JPMorgan Chase had maintained its 2007 philanthropic budget as well as Wash-
ington Mutual’s level of philanthropy from the same year, the increase would be 
$3.4 million more. Once again, it is evident how JPMorgan Chase’s acquisition of 
Washington Mutual resulted in fewer resources being deployed in neighborhoods 
across New York City.
Obviously, the expanding philanthropic commitment of these institutions is a posi-
tive development; yet also a bit surprising given the reductions in the banks’ other 
community development activities. None of the banks we analyzed, however, met 
the threshold of dedicating 2% of their pre-tax earnings to philanthropy, which is 
outlined in our Reinvestment Principles. It should be noted that Washington Mu-
tual had committed to this level of giving, but JPMorgan Chase did not honor the 
commitment when they took over.
While ANHD believes it is logical to link a bank’s philanthropic budget to its earn-
ings, we are discouraged by the percentage of a bank’s deposits that are earmarked 
for grant making. Table 8 shows those banks that dedicate the largest percentage 
and Deutsche Bank is the clear leader in this area. Yet it is easy to see that an in-
credibly small amount of deposits are deployed for philanthropic endeavors as no 
bank comes close to committing even a single percent of their deposit base to these 
initiatives.   
There are a few other grant making trends that we are concerned about. First, a 
smaller percentage of CRA-eligible grants are supporting affordable housing. In 
2007, 31.8% of CRA-eligible grants were dedicated to a purpose related to afford-
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31 According to FDIC Summary of Deposit 
data for the period ending June 30, 2008, there 
were 1707 bank branches. Thus, the data 
regarding branches in this analysis represents 
almost 78% of the total branches in the city.
32 Neighborhood Financial Services Study: An 
Analysis of Supply and Demand in Two New York 
City Neighborhoods. New York City Department 
of Consumer Affairs, Office of Financial Em-
powerment. Available at: http://www.nyc.gov/
html/ofe/downloads/pdf/NFS_ExecSumm.pdf
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able housing compared to 24.1% in 2008. Given that the lack of affordable housing is a 
problem facing such a high share of working class New Yorkers, ANHD has set a target of 
dedicating at least 50% of a bank’s CRA-related philanthropy to housing-related activities. 
Over the two year period, Bank of America, HSBC, M&T and Deutsche Bank were the only 
institutions that met this threshold at least once.
The other trend is that fewer banks are supporting community-based not-for-profit orga-
nizations. While it is important for the bank’s philanthropic program to support a wide 
array of issues and institutions, local housing groups are the organizations best positioned 
to respond to on the ground issues related to housing, neighborhood stabilization and eco-
nomic development. ANHD recognizes that a formal, RFP-style grant program may be 
more resource intensive than simply writing a few large checks to citywide organizations 
or intermediaries, but we believe it is central to a bank having a strong record of providing 
community development services. Capital One is particularly strong in this area as 75% of 
its grants are provided to community based organizations.
BRANCHING
Lack of access to credit and basic banking services in their neighborhoods still remains a 
serious problem for low- and moderate-income New Yorkers.  We continue to have a great 
many un-banked and under-banked communities such as Jamaica in Queens and Melrose 
in the Bronx, and urge local banks to establish equitable branching patterns as  
they expand. 
In terms of equitable branching, ANHD wants to see 25% of a bank’s total branches in New 
York City located in LMI neighborhoods. This is a reasonable benchmark given almost 
56% of census tracts in New York City are classified as low- and moderate-income mean-
ing that more than half of the households living there earn a moderate-income wage or 
below.30 While a common refrain among banks is that online banking and ATMs are appro-
priate alternative service vehicles, the fact that over half of New Yorkers live in LMI areas 
signals that there is a market that is eager for access to mainstream financial services and 
a physical bank branch.   
As table 10 illustrates, there is a significant difference in the way commercial and savings 
banks site their branches. Of the ten commercial banks we analyzed, six met the 25% 
threshold in 2007, 2008 or both. For the five savings we examined, only Apple Bank met the 
threshold. Therefore, while savings banks tend to serve neighborhoods better across many 
activities due to their more localized focus, in the case of branching, larger commercial 
retail banks have  stronger branch networks because of their larger footprint.  
An equally important benchmark related to branch siting is that at least 10 percent of a 
bank’s total branches be located in low-income neighborhoods. In the two year period, the 
number of branches operated by the 17 responding banks increased by 11.7% (from 1192 
branches to 1331).31  Yet only 4.3% (6 out of the 138) of the new branches were located in 
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low-income census tracts. Therefore, the overall percentage of branches in low-
income tracts actually decreased from 9.3% to 8.8%. 
Measured against this benchmark, the vast majority of New York City banks must 
improve. In fact, of the 17 banks, only three—Apple Bank for Savings, Banco Popu-
lar, and JPMorgan Chase—have met this threshold. Table 11 details the banks that 
best serve low-income neighborhoods in terms of having a physical presence in 
the community.
The weak branch penetration in low-income neighborhoods is problematic as the 
lack of access to financial services should make it hard for banks to claim they are 
serving the convenience and needs of local residents. Furthermore, it also enables 
the existence of predatory lenders and cash checking businesses that charge exor-
bitant fees and other unregulated actors who prey on working class residents.    
That being said, a physical branch is just one component of ensuring residents 
have access to financial services. A recent study by the New York City Department 
of Consumer Affairs found that, “the fundamental mismatch between current fi-
nancial products offered and consumer transactional needs—getting cash, paying 
bills, and buying goods—appears to be the major determinate in whether and how 
individuals with low incomes use mainstream financial institutions.” 22  Thus, it is 
also essential that banks create and market products that respond to local custom-
ers’ needs.
% OF BRANCHES IN LOW-INCOME TRACTS (2008)
 COMMERCIAL BANKS
RANK BANK
Banco Popular
JPMorgan Chase
M&T
1
2
3
 10.4%
   7.7%
Table 11  
33.3%
SAVINGS BANKS
RANK BANK
Apple Bank
Signature
1
2  2.9%
17.6%
% BRANCHES IN  
LI TRACTS
% BRANCHES IN 
LI TRACTS
NY Community Bank3  2.9%
% OF BRANCHES IN LOW- OR MODERATE-INCOME TRACTS (2008)
 COMMERCIAL BANKS
RANK BANK
HSBC
Bank of America
Wachovia
1
2
3
34.0%
31.0%
Table 10 
73.3%
SAVINGS BANKS
RANK BANK
Apple Bank
Sovereign/Santender
1
2 16.0%
55.9%
% BRANCHES IN  
LMI TRACTS
% BRANCHES IN 
LMI TRACTS
3 NY Community Bank 14.7%
ANHD  |  OVERALL RANKINGS
33 PART II
The rankings on the following page are not intended to characterize banks as either 
“good” or “bad.” Rather, they are meant to provide a snapshot of how well New York City 
banks served the credit needs of LMI households and neighborhoods compared to their 
peers in 2007 and 2008. As mentioned previously, ANHD compiled data on 37 different 
reinvestment activities including branching, staffing, multi-family lending, community de-
velopment lending, CRA-qualified investment, home purchase loans, and philanthropy. 
The rankings are based on nine indicators that represent core reinvestment activities and 
those areas where the most data was provided by the banks. 
It is our expectation that banks are committed to expanding the volume of 
these activities on a year-over-year basis and improving the marketing and 
delivery mechanisms to ensure low- and moderate-income communities are 
well served. Unfortunately, all 17 banks that we examined saw retrenchment 
in at least one area from 2007 to 2008. These reductions are denoted by red 
arrows in Appendix A. 
While ANHD did not account for year-over-year performance in these rank-
ings, it is our intention to do so going forward. One important factor that we 
will consider is the magnitude of these increases and reductions. For instance, 
although Citi’s ranking fell from #2 to #6 over the two-year period, it prob-
ably should have fallen even more drastically given the enormous drop-off 
in lending and investment in just a single year. As the Appendix A illustrates, between 
2007 and 2008, Citi authorized an 85.5% decrease in the number of community develop-
ment loans originated and an 84% cut in the amount of dollars invested in CRA-qualified 
activities. Conversely, while many banks were contracting their philanthropic budgets, TD 
Bank North expanded its CRA-eligible grantmaking by 46.6%. ANHD feels strongly that 
it is important to provide incentives that encourage banks to better serve working class 
populations as well as think creatively about how to leverage their resources to maximize 
public benefit.  
    ANHD feels 
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It should be noted that ANHD did not weight the indicators so the actual amount of the 
differential between two banks’ level of activity matters less than the more straightforward 
measure of who did more or less. Indeed, some institutions near the top or bottom of the 
rankings scored consistently high or low on all nine indicators, the performance of others 
was quite uneven. For example, in 2008, JPMorgan Chase scored in the top 3 in 
several categories such as the percentage of branches in LMI neighborhoods, 
the percentage of multi-family loans in LMI tracts, and the percentage of 
community development loans to not-for-profit borrowers. At the same time, 
the bank had the second worst record in terms of how much of its total depos-
its it reserved for community development lending. Additionally, although 
Bank of America secured the top ranking in 2008 based on the strength of its 
branching, multi-family lending, community development lending with not-
for-profits, and grantmaking that supported the creation of affordable hous-
ing, it would have likely slipped had loan modification data been considered in 
the rankings. 
Moreover, there are a few banks where the data cannot capture its true re-
cord of serving, or not serving, LMI communities. For example, New York 
Community Bank’s multi-family lending has endangered affordable housing throughout 
the city by providing the city’s most notorious slumlords with unlimited financing. Fur-
thermore, the bank has been completely unresponsive to requests for meetings and in-
formation. In fact, ANHD has found New York Community Bank to be in a league of its 
own in terms of its lack of accountability to the communities in which it does business or 
indifference to public criticism. Given the emphasis that CRA places on public input, there 
is no excuse for banks that seemingly have no interest in engaging with representatives 
from the community. 
Although there are numerous banks who continue to be responsive partners, as a whole 
ANHD is disappointed with the direction the banking industry has taken related to serving 
low- and moderate-income populations in New York City. Given the experience of our 99 
members, it would be surprising if the banks’ 2009 numbers were more encouraging. As 
Part III will explain, numerous steps must be taken in both the immediate and intermediate 
terms to reverse these trends and ensure the city’s banking partners renew their commit-
ment to meeting their CRA obligations in a meaningful way. 
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As others have proposed, ANHD believes there are immediate and intermediate 
steps that can be taken to update the CRA regulatory framework so it continues to 
catalyze community development and other bank reinvestment activities.33 Most 
critical is the need to strengthen the enforcement underpinnings of CRA by creat-
ing more leverage for community engagement and incentivizing banks to seek 
the highest CRA rating. Additionally, banks, regulators, and community advocates 
must consider the outcomes of a financial institution’s reinvestment activities and 
not just the number and dollar amount. Indeed, ANHD believes the stability and 
profitability of these activities and the long-term financial and economic health of 
the community are inherently linked. We believe the actions detailed below would 
go a long way to reversing these trends and ensuring banks dedicate a meaningful 
amount of resources to lending, investment and services in New York City. 
IMMEDIATE TERM  
In the near term, an interim rule for comment34 is necessary that would:
Encourage Regulators to Tailor Assessment Criteria to the Local Performance Context 
and Place More Emphasis on Community Development 
ANHD recognizes that many banks have tailored their business models in such a 
way that makes it difficult for them to provide certain products or engage in the 
full range of CRA-related activities. That being said, it is ANHD’s belief that for 
the largest banks, it would be incredibly hard to justify not providing a product 
or program that impacts such a large segment of the assessment area’s residents 
and neighborhoods. In New York City, this means that lending and investment sup-
porting the creation and preservation of multi-family properties and community 
development activities would receive greater weight. 
Indeed, community development loans and investment are central to building 
strong neighborhoods and supporting the work of CDCs, but currently count only 
THE NEED FOR MORE  
RIGOROUS ENFORCEMENT  
AND CRA MODERNIZATION
PART III:
33 December 15, 2009, Letter to the Federal 
Financial Institutions Examination Council. 
Signed by 19 institutions including tax credit 
syndicators, community development interme-
diaries, lenders and financial institutions, and 
advocacy organizations. Letter available at: 
http://www.enterprisecommunity.org/public_
policy/documents/cra_letter_to_ffiec.pdf
34 Interim rules, which often are issued jointly 
by the various federal regulators, explain the 
reason for any recommended change to policy, 
and include data, information, or authority 
supporting that change.
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for extra credit. These activities must receive additional credit to achieve parity with home 
purchase and small business lending, especially in cities like New York where the housing 
stock is comprised mostly of multi-family rental properties. In the rare case where banks 
cannot be induced to provide the full range of essential products, the banks should be re-
quired to demonstrate how they are meeting their obligations in other ways.
Strengthen the Regulatory System by Developing Regulations that Value Both the Quantity and 
Quality of Lending, Investment, and Services in Performance Exams
It is clear that performance assessments have become increasingly volume driven. This 
gives an unfair advantage to the largest institutions and leads banks to support cookie cut-
ter deals rather than develop innovative products and programs. Regrettably, it may also 
reward banks for engaging in activities that have had a negative impact on communities. 
For example, in New York City, it is likely that banks who underwrote “Predatory Equity”-
backed deals received CRA credit for loans that have displaced low- and moderate-income 
families and de-stabilized neighborhoods. Again, one way for regulators to determine 
whether a multi-family loan will have lead to these negative consequences is to examine 
the debt service coverage ratio. 
Examinations must move beyond simply rewarding dollar and unit volumes, and actually 
determine which activities have had a positive impact on strengthening communities. For 
example, credit enhancements that enable community development financing, such as let-
ters of credit, should be given equal or near equal weight to loans and investments. Overall, 
regulations should be reworked to ensure exams are not merely checklists that are driven 
by volume, but the qualitative impact as well. 
Require Local Strategic Plans and Reporting
As noted above, as banks have become larger national and global institutions, they have 
grown increasingly distant from the local community. Banks must adhere to the spirit of 
the CRA by developing local plans for how they intend to help meet community credit 
needs. These plans should detail their strategy, including community context analysis and 
quantitative and qualitative goals, to meet the lending, investment, and service needs of 
low- and moderate-income borrowers. Furthermore, the plan should explain the products 
and programs the bank has developed to respond to local needs and opportunities. On an 
annual basis, banks should release Annual Reports that document how their activities have 
been targeted to meet the goals outlined in these plans. The plan and accompanying annual 
reports should be incredibly helpful to regulators to more fully incorporate both quantita-
tive and qualitative measures in their performance assessments. 
ANHD believes these plans will also significantly strengthen the CRA by more effectively 
engaging the community. The CRA was designed, from its inception, to involve the local 
community in a dialogue with banks as part of the CRA exam process and during merg-
ers and acquisitions. This important aspect of CRA enforcement has been weakened by 
industry consolidation which has resulted in institutions so large that the local community 
is unable to understand or obtain information about a bank’s local activities. Requiring a 
publically available, local plan would invite informed community input and dialogue with 
ANHD  |    RIGOROUS ENFORCEMENT AND MODIFICATION
PART III 39
the banks, even as consolidation continues. Again this change would also assist the regu-
lators during the “Community Contacts” portion of an exam as it would result in a larger 
number of engaged, informed partners. 
Enhance Meaning of “Outstanding” Rating and Increase Incentives for Banks to Strive to  
Achieve It
Currently, over 95% of banks receive at least a “Satisfactory” rating from their regulator. 
As the number of banks receiving a passing grade has expanded, the value of achieving 
an “Outstanding” rating has diminished. In order to encourage banks to be leaders in com-
munity reinvestment, it is clear that additional incentives, as well as sanctions, must be 
created. Ideas include: cheaper credit from the Federal Reserve Bank’s discount window, 
an exemption from undergoing a merger-driven exam, or extra credit for non-standard 
products, grants, and letters of credit.  
Establish a clear CRA commitment for Bank Holding Companies
Numerous investment banks including American Express, Goldman Sachs and Morgan 
Stanley have recently converted into bank holding companies. A principle reason behind 
these moves is gaining access to customer deposits, which are a stable source of funding. 
While the commercial bank owned by the bank holding company bank is regulated, the 
CRA obligations for the bank holding companies are less clear. As institutions with their 
headquarters in New York City, it seems reasonable that the city be included as an assess-
ment area under CRA for these new entities.   
Maximize Consistency and Transparency
Currently, there is a great deal of variation across examiners. The FFIEC should determine 
CRA-eligibility of specific projects or classes of projects to provide banks some assurance 
that their lending, investment and services will lead to a strong grade. 
INTERMEDIATE TERM
In the longer term, legislation needs to be passed that would address those issues that are 
not of a regulatory nature. These bills include: 
Pass a Local “Responsible Banking” Ordinance
Although ANHD is optimistic that both regulatory and legislative fixes at the federal level 
will move forward in a timely fashion, we are also mindful of New York City’s ability to ini-
tiate changes through the local legislative process. Cities across the nation including Cleve-
land, Los Angeles and Philadelphia have undertaken similar strategies with great success. 
Indeed, all three cities have either introduced or passed ordinances that require banks to 
submit annual reports with the city that detail the programs and products they will offer to 
help meet the city’s credit needs. The cities then evaluate the banks performance based on 
these reports and reward performing institutions with deposits, city contracts, and pension 
funds. Cleveland and Philadelphia, the two cities that have enacted these ordinances, have 
found the incentives to be sufficient for encouraging banks to develop local plans and cre-
ate comprehensive community development programs. 
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ANHD is proposing the creation of a “Responsible Banking” ordinance for New York City 
with the following structure:
Require each bank that wants to do business with the city to prepare a “local CRA 
Plan” with a clear statement of what the banks sees as the key credit needs of the  
local community and how the bank intends to fulfill those credit needs. 
Require banks to submit an Annual Progress Report that documents how the bank 
fulfilled the goals of its plan for the previous year. 
Require mayoral agency, with input from members of the City Council, to evaluate the 
comprehensiveness and reasonableness of the bank’s local CRA Plan as well as the 
Annual Progress Report.
Consider, to the greatest extent possible, the mayoral agency’s findings related to which 
banks have been found to be in compliance with the requirement to file local plans and 
progress reports in deciding which institutions to do business with.  
Encourage the City Council and mayoral agency to use the local plans and the banks’ 
performance both to push the financial institutions to more fully commit to partnering 
in the community development efforts of the city and to put public pressure on the banks 
to develop programs and products that are most needed by low- and moderate-income 
communities in New York City. 
We believe that a New York City Responsible Banking ordinance would create a tool for lo-
cal influence on the community investment practices of our banking institutions, and give 
the City Council, the City of New York, and engaged citizens in communities throughout 
the city a powerful mechanism to provide input related to our credit needs that would help 
ensure local oversight. 
Enact CRA Modernization
The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) has been one of the most important laws for 
building wealth and revitalizing neighborhoods since its passage in 1977. However, the 
financial services sector has changed dramatically in the three decades since and the law 
has not been altered to reflect the shifts in how banks do business and other trends in the 
lending industry. In order to ensure the CRA remains an effective law and meets the on-
going needs of LMI borrowers and communities, modernization legislation needs to be 
passed. 
Legislation introduced by Rep. Eddie Bernice Johnson last session would apply CRA to a 
variety of non-bank institutions, require federal regulatory agencies to hold more public 
hearings and meetings when banks merge, enhance accountability through data disclosure 
and introducing more publicly available ratings, address racial disparities in lending by 
•
•
•
•
•
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requiring CRA exams to explicitly consider lending and services to minorities in 
addition to LMI communities, and bolster the accountability of banks to all com-
munities, among other things.
Additionally, ANHD recommends expanding data disclosure requirements to in- 
clude community development activities and create a new community development 
test for large banks. The latter recommendation is especially important as it would 
encourage banks to think more comprehensively about the range of products and 
policies it needed to provide to best fulfill its CRA obligations. The current 
community development test for a wholesale bank could be a model that is 
adapted for this purpose.  
 
Implement Regulatory Reform Including Creation of an Independent Robust Consumer  
Financial Protection Agency
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, currently a part of, must become an in-
dependent agency that is empowered to truly protect consumers include enabling 
states to play a stronger role in enforcing consumer protection laws, which banks 
have tended to disregard; having oversight authority across all types of Wall Street 
financial products; and reconciling the long-standing conflict between the needs 
of financial firms and consumers.35 In all, these steps should ensure consumers 
have comprehensible information to make responsible financial decisions, gain 
access to financial services, and are protected from abuse, unfairness, deception, 
and discrimination.
CONCLUSION
Over the past thirty years, grassroots leaders and community institutions, work-
ing in partnership with banks and the local government, have successfully trans-
formed their neighborhoods into safe, decent and welcoming places for New York-
ers of all income levels and all walks of life.
The accomplishments of these community groups and their partners would not 
have been possible without the CRA.  The ongoing ability of working class resi-
dents to build wealth and the continued vitality of these neighborhoods are depen-
dent on banks reaffirming their commitment to providing loans, investment, and 
financial services that are responsive to local needs.
35 Satow, Julie. “Battle Brewing On Capital Hill 
Over Obama’s Proposed Consumer Protection 
Agency,” The Huffington Post.  
Available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2009/06/17/battle-brewing-on-
capitol_n_217088.html
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COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT  
PRINCIPLES FOR NEW YORK CITY
2010
APPENDIX B 
BACKGROUND 
The Association for Neighborhood & Housing Development (ANHD) is a membership orga-
nization of non-profit community organizations serving low- and moderate-income neigh-
borhoods throughout the five boroughs of New York City.  The ninety-eight neighborhood 
groups which make up the ANHD membership work on the full spectrum of community 
development activities associated with the Community Reinvestment Act; ANHD members 
engage in affordable housing development and management, neighborhood revitalization 
activities, community organizing, economic development efforts, housing counseling and 
financial literacy services.  Most of these community groups, like the CRA itself, were cre-
ated in response to the redlining and disinvestment that threatened to destroy our neigh-
borhoods back in the 1970s.  Over the past thirty years, grassroots leaders and community 
institutions, working in partnership with banks and local government, have successfully 
transformed their neighborhoods into safe, decent and welcoming places for New Yorkers 
of all income levels and all walks of life.
The accomplishments of these community groups and their partners would not have 
been possible without the Community Reinvestment Act.  As our communities face new 
challenges and opportunities today, the CRA still remains a central and necessary tool in 
preserving our neighborhoods and in ensuring access to credit for lower-income  
New Yorkers.
WHY WE GENERATED THESE PRINCIPLES 
CRA is, by its very nature, local; it requires that banks meet community credit needs.  How-
ever, as banks have grown in recent years, evolving from community banks into large 
regional, national and even global financial institutions, they have, by necessity, grown 
increasingly distant from the local community.  These CRA principles are meant to pro-
vide guidance to banks doing business in NYC: to inform them of emerging local needs of 
which they may not be aware and to share best practices in community development that 
our members have identified through their collective experience in the field.   
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We believe that the adoption of these principles and these best practices by NYC financial 
institutions will strengthen the banks’ existing CRA programs and will support our shared 
goal of fair access to credit for all New York City residents.
INSTITUTIONAL COMMITMENT TO CRA  
(STAFFING, STRUCTURE & LEADERSHIP)
It has been ANHD’s experience that the banks with the most effective CRA programs re-
flect a broad institutional commitment to CRA and community development.  This commit-
ment begins with leadership, where senior executives are knowledgeable about, engaged 
in, and committed to a bank’s CRA programs. In addition to committed leadership, strong 
CRA programs require the bank to have adequate levels of staff with appropriate expertise 
dedicated to each of its local markets, in this case, New York City.  
As noted above, an effective CRA program needs to be locally-focused and flexible so as to 
meet changing community needs and priorities. In New York City, priorities change from 
year to year, as new issues arise, and needs also differ among individual neighborhoods.  A 
bank should have a local CRA plan which responds to that reality.  
Specific to New York City, we ask that a bank:
Develop a detailed CRA plan for the five boroughs of NYC which establishes concrete 
objectives and targets in the areas of CRA-related lending, investment and services. 
The plan should also identify financial and human resources needed for its implemen-
tation. Furthermore, the plan should reflect local needs and priorities.
Create a centralized community development group dedicated to New York City and 
staffed by a senior executive, to coordinate and monitor the bank’s various CRA 
programs here. 
Foster a bank culture that values CRA activities by educating all levels of staff about 
the bank’s CRA policies and commitments. 
Empower local staff who have local knowledge to develop CRA products and pro-
grams targeted to local needs.
Work collaboratively with community leaders through a NYC community advisory 
council and through other vehicles to identify and respond to emerging needs in the 
City’s LMI neighborhoods.
Communicate regularly with NYC community stakeholders about the bank’s CRA 
products and programs.
•
•
•
•
•
•
ANHD  |  REINVESTMENT PRINCIPLES
47 APPENDIX B
BRANCHES
Lack of access to credit and basic banking services in their neighborhoods still remains a 
serious problem for low- and moderate-income New Yorkers.  We continue to have a great 
many un-banked and under-banked communities and we urge local banks to establish eq-
uitable branching patterns as they expand.
 
Specific to NYC, we ask that a bank:
Locate 25 percent of its total full service branches in NYC in LMI neighborhoods, with 
at least 10 percent of the total branches in low-income neighborhoods. 
Designate a staff person to work with local community groups to identify and site new 
branches in underserved communities.
MULTI-FAMILY AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT  
LENDING & INVESTMENT
In New York City, preservation and expansion of the affordable housing stock continues 
to be a core community development priority. Two thirds of all New Yorker’s live in rental 
housing, and, in the case of low-income New Yorkers, that percentage increases substan-
tially: more than 80% of low-income households rent. In order to effectively meet commu-
nity credit needs within NYC’s local performance context, banks need to engage in mean-
ingful levels of multi-family lending which reflect responsible underwriting and which has 
a positive impact on the City’s low- and moderate-income communities. 
Specific to New York City, we ask that a bank:
In keeping with the nature of the City’s affordable housing stock, undertake meaning-
ful levels of responsible multi-family lending in our LMI neighborhoods. 
Ensure that projects undertaken as part its CRA program have a positive impact on 
the community in which they are sited. 
Develop products to finance the preservation of NYC’s at-risk federally-assisted af-
fordable housing.
Generate the majority (more than 50%) of the bank’s community development loans 
and investments- and, specifically, its housing loans- with non-profit sponsors.
Participate in local efforts to promote successful models of long-term housing 
affordability.
Institute procedures to prevent abusive multi-family lending practices such as loans 
to predatory equity investors or slumlords. Ensure that multi-family loans are  
responsibly underwritten.  
Distribute loans equitably throughout the City’s five boroughs.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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HOMEOWNERSHIP
New York City also has a large homeowner population; approximately 1/3 of our residents 
are homeowners, including over 325,000 lower-income households.  As such, we have a 
continuing need for responsible home mortgage lending.  In addition to a need for afford-
able home purchase products, including responsible products targeted to LMI borrowers 
and to first-time homebuyers, it is also important that banks have products and programs 
in place to preserve homeownership and prevent foreclosure.
Specific to New York City, we ask that a bank:
Commit to mortgage lending to LMI households that is proportionate to the percent of 
LMI households in the city as a whole.   
Institutionalize LMI mortgage lending with salaried (rather than commissioned) loan 
officers to serve the home buying needs of low- and moderate-income consumers who 
are buying their first homes. 
Develop and/or expand partnerships with neighborhood groups to support counsel-
ing, financial literacy, down payment assistance, and other services in the areas of 
homeowner creation and foreclosure prevention.
Adopt responsible lending practices that take into account the borrower’s income and 
ability to pay their mortgage. 
Develop a local program, working closely with community groups, to protect current 
and future customers at risk of foreclosure. If applicable, restructure high cost, sub-
prime or exotic mortgages to help keep people in their homes.
PHILANTHROPY
CRA- related philanthropy has played and continues to play a crucial role in the ability of 
community groups to further their missions of creating and preserving safe, decent  
affordable neighborhoods for low- and moderate-income New Yorkers. 
As part of its overall CRA strategy and specific to NYC, we ask that a bank:
Dedicate at least 2% of pre-tax earnings to the community, at least half of which takes 
the form of CRA-eligible grants.  
Commit to an annual local CRA philanthropic budget for NYC that is proportionate 
to the % of the bank’s overall deposits here.  If, for example, 10% of a bank’s overall 
deposits nationally are derived from NYC, 10% of the bank’s philanthropic budget 
should be allocated to the City.
In the event of a merger or consolidation, commit to maintaining as a floor the sepa-
rate CRA-philanthropic levels of the merging institutions.  
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Coordinate the bank’s CRA-related grantmaking with its CRA-lending and investment 
strategy. That is, ensure that both the lending and grantmaking effectively supports local 
community development needs. 
Adopt transparent grant making procedures and affirmatively market philanthropic 
programs to local community groups. 
Lead and participate in local strategic donor collaboratives to leverage and better 
coordinate community investments.
Award a majority of CRA-eligible grants to neighborhood-based organizations. 
ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY
It has been ANHD’s experience that the most effective CRA strategies are characterized 
by transparency and community accountability.
We ask that a bank operating in NYC:
Generate an annual report to the community on its CRA activities in NYC. We ask 
that this report include, for the City as whole and for each borough, data on the 
bank’s CRA-eligible lending, investment and services here, including community 
development lending and grantmaking.  This report should be available through the 
bank’s website and at each of its NYC branches.  
Designate a staff person to respond to information requests from community institu-
tions and residents on the bank’s CRA activities in a specific neighborhood.
CONCLUSION
Over the past thirty years, area banks have been central partners in investing in and 
supporting NYC’s low- and moderate-income communities.   These CRA Principles are 
meant to assist banks, as they grow, in sustaining these local partnerships.  ANHD and its 
members strongly believe that, working together collaboratively, banks and community 
groups can continue to keep our City and our neighborhoods welcoming places for all 
New Yorkers. 
For more information on ANHD’s reinvestment activities contact our Reinvestment  
Working Group at 212-747-1117 x 21.
•
•
•
•
•
•
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May 11, 2009  
«Title» «First_Name» «Last_Name»
«Bank»
«Street»
«Address»
Dear «Title» «Last_Name»,
The Association for Neighborhood and Housing Development (ANHD) is a non-profit mem-
ber organization of ninety-eight neighborhood-based housing groups in New York City. 
Our members serve low- and moderate-income communities and households throughout 
the five boroughs. I am writing to submit our annual request for information concerning 
«Bank»’s CRA-related activities in New York City for calendar year 2008.
As you may know, ANHD has recently developed “Community Reinvestment Principles” 
for bank’s doing business in New York City (see enclosed). These CRA principles are meant 
to provide guidance to banks doing business in the city: to inform them of emerging local 
needs they may not be aware of and to share best practices in community development that 
our members have identified through their collective experience in the field. The principles 
are both quantitative and qualitative in nature as we believe a strong CRA record is not 
just about outputs, but rather targeting products and programs to meet community credit 
needs. 
Therefore, we are very interested in learning more about «Bank»’s CRA-related activities 
in New York City, especially its community development lending, investment and services 
for 2008. We would like this information on the activities of «Bank» and all other subsid-
iaries and affiliates doing business in New York City. Also, where available, we would like 
information on your lending and investment targets for the city in 2009. In addition to pro-
SAMPLE INFORMATION  
REQUEST LETTER
APPENDIX C 
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viding responses to our specific questions, please feel free to provide any information on 
activities that reflect «Bank»’s commitment to New York City’s low- and moderate-income 
neighborhoods and residents. 
EXISTENCE OF A LOCAL CRA PLAN
As noted above, we believe an effective CRA program needs to be locally-focused and 
flexible so as to meet changing community needs and priorities. In New York City, priori-
ties change from year to year, as new issues arise, and needs also differ among individual 
neighborhoods.  A bank should have a local CRA plan which responds to that reality.  Does 
«Bank» have a CRA plan for the five boroughs of New York City which reflects local needs 
and priorities and establishes concrete objectives and targets in the areas of CRA-related 
lending, investment and services?  
 
DEPOSITS & BRANCHES
We are requesting the following information concerning «Bank»’s deposits and branches 
in New York City as of December 31, 2008: 
Total dollar amount of deposits
Number of bank branches within the five boroughs
Number of those branches that were located in low-income census tracts
Number of those branches that were located in moderate-income census tracts 
Additionally, please provide information on whether «Bank» opened or closed any branch-
es in New York City in 2008? If so, please let us know how many of those branches were in 
low-income tracts and how many were in moderate-income tracts.
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT STAFFING
We are requesting the following information concerning «Bank»’s community develop-
ment staffing as of December 31, 2008: 
Does the bank have a centralized community development group dedicated to New 
York City and staffed by a senior executive?
Number of community development lending staff serving the New York City market
Number of total community development lending staff located in the city
Number of staff supporting «Bank»’s CRA-related philanthropy in New York City
Number of staff who support CRA-related philanthropy that are located in the city
Are there any other «Bank» employees responsible for carrying out the bank’s CRA and 
fair lending obligations in New York City? How many of these people physically work out 
of offices located in the city?
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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MULTI-FAMILY LENDING
We are requesting the following information concerning «Bank»’s multi-family  
lending in 2008: 
Number of multi-family loans originated in New York City as a whole and  
by borough
Total dollar amount of multi-family loans originated in the city and by borough  
Number of multi-family loans for properties in low- and moderate-income (LMI) 
neighborhoods in the city as a whole and by borough
Total dollar amount of multi-family loans for properties in LMI neighborhoods in the 
city and by borough
Community Development Lending and Investment
We are requesting the following information concerning «Bank»’s community  
development lending in 2008:
 
Number of community development loans originated in NYC as a whole and  
by borough
Total dollar amount of community development loans originated in the city  
and by borough
Number of community development loans made to nonprofit sponsors / borrowers
Total dollar amount of community development loans made to nonprofit  
sponsors / borrowers
Number and dollar amount of community development loans for affordable housing
 
For calendar year 2008, what were the: 
Number of qualified investments made in New York City
Total dollar amount of qualified investments made in New York City
Number and dollar amount of these investments made with not-for-profit sponsors  
For 2009, what are «Bank»’s targets for community development lending and investment 
in New York City? Specifically, will the bank be investing in Low Income Housing Tax 
Credits? If so, what is the anticipated level of investment?
AFFORDABLE HOMEOWNERSHIP
We are requesting the following information concerning «Bank»’s home purchase loans 
in New York City in 2008: 
Number of home purchase loans originated in New York City
Total dollar amount of home purchase loans in the city
Number of home purchase loans originated with low-income (LI)  
borrowers in the city
Total dollar amount of home purchase loans originated with LI borrowers in the city
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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•
•
•
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Number of home purchase loans made with moderate-income (MI) borrowers  
in the city 
Total dollar amount of home purchase loans originated with MI borrowers in the city
PHILANTHROPY
We are requesting the following information concerning «Bank»’s philanthropy in New 
York City in 2008: 
Total dollar amount awarded in CRA-eligible grants in New York City and  
by borough 
Total dollar amount of CRA-eligible grants made to neighborhood-based community 
groups? To citywide organizations?
Specific to the city, the percent of total grants that were awarded for affordable  
housing last year? For community development? For financial literacy?
Additionally, please provide information on the bank’s participation in local strategic 
donor collaboratives or coalitions that seek to leverage and better coordinate community 
investments.
Finally, what is the total CRA philanthropic budget for New York City for 2009?
If you have any questions, do not hesitate to call me at (212) 747-1117 x17 or email me at 
benjamin.d@anhd.org. Please send the requested information to my attention at:
     
Benjamin Dulchin, Executive Director
     ANHD
     50 Broad Street, Suite 1125
     New York, NY 10004
Thank you very much,
 
Benjamin Dulchin
Executive Director
cc:  ANHD Banking/Reinvestment Working Group
•
•
•
•
•
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Washington 
Mutual
Expected 
Combined 
Activity based 
on 2007
Better or 
Worse than 
Expected
Type of Institution Fed Savings 
Regulator OTS
2007 2007 2008
STAFFING
CD Staff Serving NY 9 46 18 53 Worse
CD Staff located in NYC 9 46 11 53 Worse
Staff supporting CRA Activity 4 18 41 22 Worse
CRA Staff Located in NYC 4 4 25 8 Worse
Branches & Deposits
Total Deposits $7.9B $192.5B $224.2B $200.4 B
Total NYC Branches 144 277 366 366
Low-Income (LI) Branches 17 23 38 40 Worse
Moderate Income (MI) Branches 39 48 72 87 Worse
% in LMI Census Tracts 38.9% 25.6% 30.1% 34.7% Worse
% in LI Census Tracts 11.8% 8.3% 10.4% 10.9% Worse
% in MI Census Tracts 27.1% 17.3% 19.7% 23.8% Worse
Multi-Family (MF) Lending
MF Lending (# Loans) 791 3 3 794 Worse
MF Lending (in $) $1.2B $7.2M $3.25 M $1.207 B Worse
MF Lending in LMI tracts (#) 536 3 3 539 Worse
MF Lending in LMI tracts ($) $790.9 M $7.2M $3.25 M $798.1 M Worse
CD Lending
CD Lending (# Loans) 12 92 110 104 Better
CD Lending (in $) $103.8 M $699.8 M $768 M $803.6 M Worse
CD Loans to Not-for-Profits (#) 3 73 82 76 Better
CD Loans to Not-for-Profits ($) $5.5 M $193.2M $331 M $198.7 M Better
CRA Qualified Investments (total #, $) $121M 19, $291M
CRA Qualified Investments (to NFPs) 14, $216 M
Affordable Housing Loans (#, $) $5.5M $152M
Affordable Housing to NFPs $62M
Mortgage Lending
Home Purchase Loans (#) 10,446 8,279
Home Purchase Loans ($) $4.4B $3.4 B
Home Purchase Loans to LI borrowers (#) 31 59 ($6.7M)
Home Purchase Loans in MI borrowers (#) 367 623 ($94.2M)
Philanthropy
Total Deposits (NYC) $7.9 B $192.5B $224.2 B $200.4 B
CRA Eligible Grants in NYC (#, $) $2.6M $12.4M $11.6 M $15 M Worse
Affordabe Housing CRA Grants (%) 32.9% 15.4% $2.47, 21%
Citywide CRA Grants (#, $) $1.5M $7.1 M 103, $6.8 M $8.6 M Worse
% of Deposits Dedicated to Philanthropy 0.033% 0.006% 0.005% 0.007% Worse
JPMorgan Chase
Nat'l Commercial
OCC
taffing
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